Anger, Faith, and Forgiveness

For me, forgiveness is a moving target because as soon as I’ve got an understanding of it it just keeps moving on me. […] Right after our tragedy, my idea of forgiveness was to be free of this thing, – the anger, the pain, the absorption. It was totally personal. It was a survival tactic to leave this experience behind. It had nothing to do with the offender. The second level was realizing how the word forgiveness applies to the relationship between the victim and the offender. How it means accepting and working on that relationship after a murder. The latter is more complicated.

--Wilma Derksen on forgiving the murder of her daughter

One afternoon in late November of 1984, a young girl went missing on her way home from school in Winnipeg, Manitoba.¹ Her body was found seven weeks later, in January of 1985. She had been tied up and left to freeze to death in an abandoned shed, though apparently not assaulted in any other way. Shortly after her body was found, the girl’s devoutly religious parents stated to the press that they had decided to forgive the murderer—a statement that was received by some as strange or even outrageous, given the nature of the crime, how little time had passed, and the fact that the perpetrator had not been identified, much less brought to justice. The parents described themselves as forgiving on faith. But how could one forgive a nameless, faceless perpetrator with whom one had no relationship at all, not even one mediated by the courts, for such a terrible deed? What were these parents trying to say or do?

Recent philosophical literature on forgiveness has, with a few exceptions, converged on the view that to forgive is to overcome resentment for moral reasons.² Adherents of this

¹ I refer here to the Candace Derksen case, as yet unsolved (The Winnipeg Free Press, November 1984 and January 1985).
² Jeffrie Murphy’s formulation of this idea has been the most influential (see Murphy and Hampton 1988). Two philosophers who diverge from this approach (in different respects) are Cheshire Calhoun (1992) and Robin Dillon (2001). I discuss Dillon’s view below. Calhoun argues that full-fledged forgiveness is an undeserved gift to a wrongdoer. Forgiveness that is merited by a wrongdoer is “minimal” forgiveness at best, since it is treatment no better than the recipient deserves, and the victim would be in the wrong not to offer it.
approach (to which I’ll henceforth refer as the standard approach) tend to treat resentment as a moral emotion properly roused by violations of our moral rights, and whose absence, in appropriate circumstances, can signal a lack of self-respect. A central challenge for philosophers taking this approach has been to identify reasons for forswearing resentment that are compatible with the victim’s self-respect and do not conflate forgiveness with excuse or condonation. The offender’s sincere repentance has emerged as a prime candidate for such a reason, with some arguing that this is the only consideration that could suffice. Others argue that forgiveness requires overcoming not just resentment but a wider range of negative emotions, in which case a wider repertoire of reasons for forgiveness may need to be considered. But all such views have one general feature in common: to count as forgiving, an agent must overcome the specified negative emotions for moral reasons.

Running through much of this literature (and, I suspect, some lay-conceptions of forgiveness) is a largely unexamined presumption about the emotional texture of forgiveness itself. Whatever their position on reasons to forgive, most participants in the debate take for granted that overcoming (in the sense of eliminating) resentment and/or other negative emotions is at least a necessary condition for genuine forgiveness. Indeed, the idea that forgiveness is incompatible with persisting negative emotions like anger is so commonplace it feels almost rash to question it. Yet nothing about this view strikes me as obvious. While certain ways of handling resentment are surely incompatible with forgiveness, it is not so clear why the

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3 See for example Joram Haber (1991).
4 See Norvin Richards (1992) and Macalester Bell, forthcoming.
5 Pamela Hieronymi articulates this intuition very clearly, stating that “while anger and love are compatible, anger and forgiveness are not compatible” (2001, 539-540), and that whereas “[w]e can be very angry with those we love […] we can’t be angry over something while claiming to have forgiven them for it” (2001, 539).
successful forgiver must experience no further anger (or sadness or disappointment) with the offender at all. Drawing on Joseph Butler and some recent work by Robin Dillon, I will argue that we should think of forgiveness as a matter of managing resentment and other negative emotions rather than as a matter of eliminating them. To forgive is to gain control over one’s negative emotions, accepting them as now part of one’s life but reinterpreting them as compatible with genuine goodwill toward a wrongdoer. Forgiveness on this account may in fact express something worth calling faith—namely, a sort of moral faith in the existence of grounds for goodwill toward those who, in wronging us, have aroused our legitimate moral anger.

1.

The idea that to forgive is to forswear resentment is typically traced to Joseph Butler’s Sermons VIII and IX, “Upon Resentment” and “Upon the Forgiveness of Injuries” (1896). However, as a few commentators have noted, this view is not really Butler’s at all. Butler requires only that we forswear abuses of resentment, and clearly treats forgiveness as compatible with some degree of persisting anger toward the wrongdoer. Like Jeffrie Murphy and other contemporary writers, Butler treats resentment as indignation or anger excited by the appearance of a moral wrong or injury to oneself. As such, resentment is closely tied to our sense of justice and moral right. For

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6 See, for example, Paul A. Newberry (2001) and Robin S. Dillon (2001). Earlier papers by R. J. O’Shaughnessy and Paul Lauritzen are also clear on this aspect of Butler’s view, though Lauritzen argues against Butler that forgiveness does involve surrendering resentment and not just checking its abuses. See O’Shaughnessy (1967, 345) and Lauritzen (1987, 146).

7 While Butler uses the terms resentment and indignation almost interchangeably, he tends to reserve “resentment” for moral indignation felt on our own behalves or on behalf of those “we consider as ourselves” (Butler 1896). This indignation is of exactly the same kind we feel on behalf of others, but tends in his view to be “in a higher degree and less transient” (Butler 1896) just because matters of our own happiness and misery tend to be more vivid and of greater natural interest to us. It should also be noted that what I refer to simply as “resentment” is what Butler refers to as “settled and deliberate” resentment, which is contrasted with the quasi-
Butler it serves a protective purpose, steeling our resolve to effect justice where our natural compassion would otherwise prevent us from acting as we ought. Resentment corrects, if you will, abuses of compassion.

But resentment too, Butler warns, is vulnerable to abuse. Self-love can lead us to react out of proportion to an injury, to misrepresent something as a greater injury than it was, or to see an injury where there was merely an innocent harm or even no harm at all. A further abuse, on which Butler focuses most of his attention in the sermon on forgiveness, concerns the desire for revenge or retaliation to which resentment may give rise, and the gratification of this desire in acts motivated by sheer malice or spite. For Butler, to forgive means no more than to “keep clear of” (Butler 1896) these abuses. The forgiving person will

[...] be affected towards the injurious person in the same way any good men, uninterested in the case, would be; if they had the same just sense, which we have supposed the injured person to have, of the fault: after which there will yet remain real goodwill towards the offender. (Butler 1896)

The forgiving person is thus not one who drives out all resentment, but one who does not allow an excess or perversion of resentment to drive out all goodwill toward the offender.

Paul A. Newberry argues that contemporary readers who accept a cognitive theory of emotion will find Butler’s account unsatisfactory, and will be drawn to accounts that focus on overcoming (not just “checking”) resentment. But it’s not clear why accepting a cognitive view of instinctive “hasty and sudden” resentment that may be aroused by any harm and is a response shared with other animals (Butler 1896).

Newberry argues that Butler focuses on managing rather than eliminating resentment (or, as Newberry interprets it, on how we act rather than on how we feel) because he thinks of emotions as brute feelings over which we have no direct control. Butler would surely reject the idea that forgiveness is about how one feels rather than how one acts. But I do not think his view implies that forgiveness has nothing to do with how one feels at all. In suggesting that the forgiving person keeps his resentment in proportion to wrongs done, Butler seems at least to imply that disproportionate anger should be sensitive to a relevant change in perspective. And even with
of emotion should necessarily push us in that direction. The belief most centrally associated with
the emotion of resentment – namely, that one has been wronged – very notably still persists in
the case of forgiveness: all parties to the debate agree that forgiveness is not excuse, and that blame remains. If we think resentment or other negative emotions must be eliminated in order to forgive, then we must find some special explanation of how this can happen in a non-
compromising way. But why rule out the possibility that it is instead some form of “anger management” that is at stake in forgiveness?

My goal is not to defend Butler’s view in all its original detail. I do, however, find certain aspects of his approach worth reconsidering. A number of philosophers have pointed out that resentment is primarily an attitude toward an action or a state of affairs brought about by an agent. The attitude that forgiveness addresses, on the other hand, seems best described as an attitude toward a person. (“I resent that____”, but “I forgive you ____”). This asymmetry suggests that forgiveness does not directly address resentment but some other, person-directed attitude or complex of attitudes with which resentment is associated or to which it may lead—a

respect to revenge and retaliation, it would oversimplify Butler’s view to conclude that forgiveness is merely a matter of checking these impulses. Butler suggests that part of what is revealed to us when we take up “the proper point of view” (Butler 1896) on our injuries is the extent to which our current perspective and motives are distorted by malice or scorn (perversions of resentment that drive out goodwill), and that this realization itself will help curb the excesses of our resentment. (Abuses of resentment, when brought to self-awareness, would appear on this view to be at least somewhat self-regulating.)

9 If, as some now argue, emotions are best understood as perceptions of value, a similar point could be made about this view: surely the normative features of reality that give rise to the resentment in the first place are not obliterated either.

10 Various possibilities have been suggested. Hieronymi (2001) argues that resentment is actually grounded in a further judgment that the wrongdoing makes a threatening claim, and that this is the judgment that is undermined by an apology.

11 See, for example, Michelle Mason (2003, 246) and Macalester Bell, n.d.
view that is structurally not so far from Butler’s notion that forgiveness addresses *abuses* of resentment rather than resentment itself.

An approach with this general form would, in my view, have the benefit of being more adequate to human moral psychology than certain currently influential alternatives. Norvin Richards, for example, argues that forgiveness requires overcoming *all* negative emotions associated with an episode of wrong-doing. This view presents an overly sanitized conception of forgiveness. Forgiving another is surely compatible with susceptibility to ongoing feelings of pain or sadness over what she has done to you (though it will not, on the approach I defend, be compatible with certain “abuses” of these feelings, such as flaunting them in the face of the wrongdoer just in order to make her feel bad).\(^{12}\) Even more narrowly tailored approaches that limit themselves to the overcoming of resentment fall short, in my view, of capturing the real emotional complexity of forgiveness. To regard one’s task in forgiving as that of entirely extirpating the moral emotions justly aroused by wrongdoing seems an invitation to self-deception or self-despair, either of which may get in the way of the real business of “changing one’s heart” toward a wrongdoer.\(^{13}\)

2.

\(^{12}\) Hieronymi (2001) makes the very rich observation that in asking another’s forgiveness one asks her to bear the scars of one’s wrongdoing within the fabric of her own life: “With forgiveness, the offended agrees to bear in her own person the cost of the wrongdoing and to incorporate the injury into her own life without further protest and without demand for retribution” (Hieronymi 2001, 551). I suggest that this may be best understood as asking another to integrate her negative emotions into her life without allowing them to define her view of, or relationship to, the wrongdoer. Clearly doing this without protest or retaliation would rule out the sort of malicious “flaunting” I mention in the text.

\(^{13}\) I take the term “changing one’s heart” from Cheshire Calhoun (1992), but it is quite widely used in the literature on forgiveness.
In a rare attempt to rehabilitate a more authentically Butlerian approach (albeit to self-forgiveness rather than the forgiveness of others), Robin Dillon argues that “[f]orgiving oneself means not that one no longer experiences self-reproach but that one is no longer in bondage to it, no longer controlled or crippled by a negative conception of oneself, so that one can now live well enough” (Dillon 2001, 83). On Dillon’s view, self-forgiveness addresses a corrosive self-relation not by changing the judgment that one did something wrong, but by addressing the perception that the wrongdoing reveals or constitutes one as a deeply flawed person with little or no moral worth. It does not mean regarding one’s moral record as cleared, nor, as noted, need it erase all the negative emotions to which one’s wrongdoing gives rise. To forgive oneself is to reinterpret oneself as someone who has moral merit in spite of a (possibly still painful) history of wrong-doing. One may have to undertake considerable reparative work before one can see one’s way to such a reinterpretation, but even then self-forgiveness requires a decision, not settled by any “underlying reality”, to see oneself one way rather than another (2001, 80). To be forgiving of oneself one must regard one’s moral record “as a transcript that as a whole is always open to interpretation and never precludes a decent future” (2001, 80).

It may not be obvious how to adapt such a model to the interpersonal case. In the case of interpersonal forgiveness, theforgiver’s own self-conception is not (necessarily) compromised, and unless the case is complicated by additional factors she will not be crippled by shame or any of the self-reflexive attitudes that Dillon takes to call for forgiveness in the intra-personal case. The wrongdoer may not herself be afflicted in any of these ways, and if she is, this will obviously not have the same significance for the forgiver as it does in the intrapersonal case, where forgiver and forgiven are one and the same and must (so to speak) get along.
Nonetheless, there are interesting analogies between the two cases. I’ve suggested that the attitude interpersonal forgiveness addresses is not an attitude toward what someone has done, but rather, an attitude toward the wrongdoer as the person who did it. As in the intra-personal case, I take this attitude to be based on a perception of the wrongdoer as deeply flawed or corrupt, and as meriting loathing, scorn, or malice.\(^\text{14}\) And while obviously directed outside the self, attitudes like malice and vengefulness are nonetheless thought to have a potentially corrosive, even paralyzing quality for those who harbor them. Those who cannot forgive often describe themselves as “consumed” by such emotions, representing this as a state of acute anguish against which they feel quite powerless to reclaim their own lives.\(^\text{15}\) Indeed, this sort of consuming rage is what the Derksens initially saw themselves as thrusting away.

Of course, my suggestion has been that *ridding* oneself of anger is not necessary for forgiveness, and that focusing on doing so may be a recipe for self-deception or self-despair. Gaining control of one’s anger, such that one is no longer dominated or paralyzed by its

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\(^\text{14}\) Thus I find Jean Hampton’s view, that in forgiving we overcome moral hatred and cease to identify the wrongdoer with the badness of his act, more congenial than the standard approach. (see Murphy and Hampton 1988). In fact, her view resonates with certain aspects of Butler’s own. Butler writes: “… in cases of offence and enmity, the whole character and behaviour is considered with an eye to that particular part which has offended us, and the whole man appears monstrous, without any thing right or human in him: whereas the resentment should surely, at least, be confined to that particular part of the behaviour which gave offence, since the other parts of a man’s life and character stand just the same as they did before” (Butler 1896). As the last part of this quote reveals, however, Butler does not go as far as Hampton to suggest that changing one’s view of the wrongdoer includes seeing them as unstained by their sin, and I find Butler’s reserve appropriate. It is quite clear, moreover, that Hampton does not take forgiveness to be compatible with anger.

\(^\text{15}\) Ruth Fowler, in the film “In the Bedroom”, finds herself consumed in just this way when she is unable to forgive the girlfriend of her murdered son for her perceived role in the tragedy. Ruth cannot stand to speak to her, and when the girl comes to apologize she can only respond by hitting her and turning away. Ruth later laments this as a horrible way to be, though it is not clear she can yet deal with her anger without (as her husband puts it) “screaming at the world”. The film *In the Bedroom* is inspired by the short story “Killings” by Andre Dubus, though the scenes I describe do not appear in the story itself.
excesses, is another matter. While the fact of an offender’s wrong-doing may never cease to be painful to the victim, coming to see the offender as still worthy of one’s goodwill does release the victim from a corrosive relationship dominated by feelings of malice, spite, or loathing:¹⁶ goodwill is compatible with at least some degree of anger, but it is clearly at odds with these latter, Butlerian abuses of resentment. To bear a person goodwill, as I understand it, is to desire her good for her own sake, while to bear her malice, or to loath or hate her, is (among other things, perhaps) to bear her ill-will. It is to “wish her ill,” as we say, or to want the bad, for her, for her own sake. It is anger expressing ill-will, not anger moderated by goodwill toward its target, that is apt to be corrosive and paralyzing. Forgiveness, on a broadly Butlerian model, restores (or, depending on the case, instates for the first time) the moderating force of goodwill toward an offender, through a reconceptualization of the offender as meriting that goodwill in spite of her offense.

Butler, as we saw, addressed this challenge by appealing to the point of view of a third party sensitive to but not absorbed by our wounds. In stepping outside of ourselves to identify with the perspective of an unprejudiced “good man”, we gain the distance we need to distinguish within ourselves between the operation of resentment proper and of more destructive, all-consuming attitudes such as malice and scorn. We cease to see the wrongdoer entirely through the prism of the particular fault exhibited in his wrongdoing, and we come to see our justified anger as supporting some attitudes, desires and motives (such as a desire for justice, which may in some cases include punishment) but not others (such as the desire to inflict misery on a wrongdoer simply for the sake of bringing her low).

¹⁶ As others have pointed out, it often also has the effect of psychologically freeing the wrongdoer to make a new start.
I think there is something promising at the core of Butler’s view. But it may seem peculiar that Butler assumes that from the point of view of the unprejudiced good man, “real goodwill” (Butler 1970, 85) toward an offender will always remain. Especially when focusing on hard cases such as the murder of a child, it is natural to wonder why this should be so. Mightn’t a clear-sighted, fair-minded third party still see nothing but evil in the perpetrator of such a wrong, and feel nothing but ill-will toward her? If so, surely this attitude cannot count as one of forgiveness, even if it is what the unprejudiced good man feels.\(^7\) If we are to rehabilitate Butler’s model, the role of the unprejudiced good man stands in need of elaboration.

One way of modeling the forgiving person, designed with Dillon’s model of self-forgiveness in mind, is as one who is disposed to reinterpret an offender as worthy of restored goodwill, even when reasons in favor of doing so are not decisive.\(^8\) I do not suggest that such reinterpretation of an offender is always psychologically possible. Just as it may take considerable reparative work to make self-forgiveness possible, an offender may have to make considerable efforts to meet her victim part way. Nor do I suggest that it is morally required whenever it is psychologically possible. But this model – call it the “fideistic” model – gives us a distinctive conception of what it is to be forgiving, either of ourselves or of others, when that is what we manage to be. On this reconstruction of Butler’s model, the unprejudiced good man is one who, in addition to being unbiased and appropriately attuned to the injustice in question, is

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\(^7\) Whether one should always retain goodwill toward the offender – whether one should always forgive – is a related question to which I return.

\(^8\) Neither Dillon nor I argue that reasons are irrelevant to forgiveness, merely that in many cases the considerations that count in favor of forgiving (or against it) are indecisive, and that this is because underlying realities are, in such cases, not generally determinate enough to yield a decisive case in one direction or the other.
disposed to view offenders as worthy of goodwill in spite of underlying indeterminacies about their characters.¹⁹

To some, the fideistic model of forgiveness will seem to veer unacceptably close to condonation. I will not attempt a full defense of the model in this paper, but I do think it is more attractive than it might at first appear. It may help to be reminded that, unlike the standard view of forgiveness, this model allows the forgiver to maintain whatever degree of moral anger or resentment is still warranted (that is, whatever degree would be still felt by the unprejudiced good man). Surely it would take some argument to show that the restoration of goodwill, regardless of that anger, itself constitutes condonation.

Consider, to make matters more vivid, the example set by Sister Helen Prejean in her book *Dead Man Walking*, where Prejean recounts and reflects on her visits to the convicted murderer Pat Sonnier. Prejean is, literally, a third party to the victim-offender relationship in question: she has no prior knowledge of or acquaintance with either the victims or the offender, and becomes involved only at the request of a prison coalition that asks her to become the “pen-pal” of a death-row inmate. She accepts the request because she sees it as fitting with her commitment to serve the poor. But her attitude toward Sonnier becomes much more complex over the course of her relationship with him. He is not merely a generic recipient of her charitable acts, but an individual about whom she comes to care and whom she struggles to understand. Prejean speaks of the jarring contrast between the Sonnier she sees during her prison visits (“the man in the clean blue denim shirt, the man always so glad to see me, who writes me letters and can’t thank me enough for my love and care” (Prejean 1993, 65)) and the other

¹⁹ In a fuller version of this paper, I compare the “fideistic” model an alternative, aretaic reconstruction of Butler, and argue that the fideistic model better does justice to Butler’s central insights. I do not have space to elaborate this argument here.
Sonnier of whom she hears from his victims’ parents (“an evil man who hung around bars with thieves and “trashy” people, who spouted obscenities, who stole, and who abducted teenage kids and raped young women” (1993, 65). Though not herself his victim, it is not easy for Prejean to reconcile these two “sides” of Sonnier. It is not clear that she ever manages it. Still, she cannot write Sonnier off: “I’ll acknowledge the evil Pat has done and make very clear that I in no way condone his crime, but I’ll try to show that he is not a monster but a human being like the rest of us in the room” (Prejean 1993, 62).

My point is not that Prejean herself has forgiven Sonnier: Prejean is not, properly speaking, in a position to forgive him, since she is not herself a victim of Sonnier’s crimes. But she does offer a credible example of a neo-Butlerian, third-party perspective from which real moral anger coexists with equally real goodwill toward the wrongdoer – the kind of perspective a forgiver must (on this particular reconstruction of Butler) take. Prejean views Sonnier’s crime with horror and holds him accountable for it – indeed, she does so in a more personally demanding way than the justice system, which doles out his punishment, or even the victims’ parents, of whose ill-will he is clearly the target until (and in at least one case, beyond) the end. It is hard to see why Prejean would even be interested in engaging Sonnier in the way she does (encouraging him to take responsibility, to be honest with himself, not to leave the world in anger, to address the parents of the murdered teens, and so on) if she did not bear him real goodwill.

Prejean’s goodwill is not limited to the recognitional respect that (on a broadly 20

Non-victims do not, by most accounts, have standing to forgive. Like many others, I use the term victim somewhat broadly to include intimates or relatives of victims (as Butler puts it, “those whom we consider as ourselves” (Butler 1970, 75)). Whether group membership gives one standing to forgive on behalf of victims is a more controversial issue, addressed, for example, in the debate over Simon Wiesenthal’s The Sunflower (1997).

21 She could, of course, have encouraged him to do some of these things for the sake of the parents. It would be clear to any reader, however, that she does them for Sonnier’s sake.
Kantian view) is owed any person, however loathsome, but is the more substantive sort of goodwill involved in finding a person still worthy of care, flaws and all. Nor is her goodwill toward Sonnier a matter of being simply “unprejudiced”. Instead, as Dillon’s account suggests, it is made possible by her having a certain sort of faith. I do not mean religious faith (although this undoubtedly played a role in her case, as it did in the Derksens’), but rather a sort moral faith in Sonnier himself – a faith that the human vulnerability and even decency that she sees in him are real, not mere sham, not simply a veil pulled over evil for self-seeking reasons. Her openness to seeing Sonnier in this way constitutes her particular sort of goodness.

Prejean may serve, I suggest, as a model of the sort of Butlerian third-party perspective taken by one who forgives. The perspective Prejean models is one from which the agent is not absorbed by her own wounds but has a just sense of the wrong, and from which her goodwill is restored – though not necessarily by eliminating her justified moral anger. (We certainly needn’t imagine that Prejean never feels anger toward Sonnier over what he has done.) Taking the sort of perspective modeled by Prejean allows moral anger to persist, but checks its abuses. Prejean feels no malice or hatred for Sonnier, and certainly does not view his entire character through the prism of his flaw. She is concerned not only for his rights or dignity but, in virtue of her moral faith in his character, bears him genuine goodwill.

That this sort of moral faith is generally a form of goodness (or in what circumstances it counts as such) deserves much more discussion that I can give it here. But it does seem plausible that genuine forgiveness will always require some such faith, even in cases where we are confronted (like Prejean) with seeming evidence of the wrongdoer’s humanity. For it is always an open question how to interpret such evidence, and indeed, whether to credit it at all. Dillon, as we’ve seen, argues that this is true even in the case of self-forgiveness: we must come to see
ourselves in one way rather than another, even though the question of how we ought to see
ourselves cannot be settled by any underlying fact of the matter. Where one has no evidence to
work with, as in the Derksens’ case, a more radical faith would seem to be required. To some,
forgiveness may seem particularly puzzling in such cases. But it is not, on the view I propose,
necessarily unreasonable or incompatible with self-respect. Forgiveness “on faith” requires
neither that one relinquish the judgment that one has been wronged nor even that one extirpate
the moral emotions justly aroused by wrongdoing. Yet paradoxically, it does yield one sort of
“freedom” from negative emotions—freedom marked not by the absence of pain or anger but by
a release from their control.
References:

Bell, Macalester. “Rethinking Repentance as a Reason to Forgive”, forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*..


