

Anderson and Velleman's "Kantian Thesis": A Case-Study in the Serpent Windings of Ethical Taxonomy

In "A Right of Self-Termination?" David Velleman argues that personal well-being does not matter, and is not an appropriate object of moral concern, unless persons matter.¹

[...] things that were good for you would not actually merit concern unless you merited concern; and if you didn't, then despite their being good for you, they wouldn't ultimately be worth wanting, after all [...] A person's good only has hypothetical or conditional value, which depends on the value of the person himself.²

The same sort of appeal to the value of an individual to explain the value of her well-being appears in Elizabeth Anderson's *Value in Ethics and Economics*.³ She writes: "if it does not make sense to value the person (in a particular way) then it does not make sense to care about promoting her welfare...enemies, who hate each other have no reason to promote each other's welfare."⁴ I call Velleman and Anderson's position "The Kantian Thesis" in part because of its superficial similarity to Kant's claim that the value of happiness is

¹ Velleman (1999a): 606-628

² Velleman (1999a): 611.

³ Adherents of *KT* typically subscribe to characterizations of value according to which an object is valuable if and only if it merits being valued. Many theorists defend this type of view, including Franz Brentano, Elizabeth Anderson, and Robert Nozick. See Brentano (1969 [1889]), Anderson (1993): 1-5, Nozick (1981): 429-35. There are many ways we can value objects, for example we can revere them, love them, care for them, respect them, admire them etc. Note that if individuals merit concern because they have feature F it does not follow that the existence of individuals with F would be good. The good, on this view, is a special species of the evaluative. It consists in those states or state-types that merit promotion, realization, or sustenance.

⁴ Anderson (1993): 26. Notice that the second part of this quote is somewhat worrisome. This passage seems to indicate that you have a reason to promote another's well-being only if you have a concern for the person to whom that well-being accrues. Velleman also says something like this see his (1999a): 610. Both Velleman and Anderson think persons merit concern, and that this explains why we ought to promote their welfare. But, if it is rational to promote the welfare of only those you care about, it follows that people who don't care for anyone ought to promote others welfare, but, have no reason to. This implication will trouble many theorists who believe that a necessary condition of something's being such that you ought to do it is that you have a reason to do it. I assume both Anderson and Velleman may merely intend to assert that those who have no concern for an individual may have no "internal" reason (loosely these are reasons provide by one's subjective set) to promote her welfare. That is position is consistent with the view that an individual's value provides an "agent-neutral" or "normative" reason to promote their welfare, which in turn explains why you ought (*ceteris paribus*) to promote her welfare.

conditioned on the unconditional value of the good will.⁵ I will avoid a technical discussion of how to most plausibly render the Kantian Thesis.⁶ For our purposes, we'll characterize it roughly as follows:

The Kantian Thesis (KT): Being good for some individual, x , is not itself a good-making feature of any state of affairs unless x merits concern.⁷

I believe the Kantian Thesis. But this paper is not about why *KT* is true.⁸ Instead, I suggest why this compelling and powerful thesis is often dismissed without substantial argument. So, while Anderson's *Value in Ethics and Economics* and Velleman's "A Right to Self-Termination?" garnered a fair amount of critical attention, less attention has been paid to *KT* itself.⁹ What is most striking, perhaps, is that *KT* almost never appears in work on formal axiology, or in work on "theories of beneficence" –i.e. axiological accounts of *well-being*.

First, I will explain briefly why *KT* is worthy of serious consideration, especially by those who work in population and welfare axiology. Next I'll consider and reject the possibility that practitioners neglect *KT* because we already have good reasons to believe states of human happiness, well-being, or pleasure are unconditionally valuable. Specifically, I'll look at some characteristic arguments for the independent and "unconditional" value of pleasure and welfare. Were these arguments successful, they would indirectly refute *KT*. After all, if pleasure and/or well-being are unconditionally valuable, their value cannot depend on the value of individuals. However, we will see that these arguments do not

⁵ Kant (1997): 7[4:393], 10 [4:396]. Of course, ends and states of affairs are distinct, and it is unclear that the "value of the good will" is best interpreted as a claim about the value of certain individuals.

⁶ For a detailed discussion of what the thesis really comes to, and how it is best understood, see my "A Defense of the Dependence Thesis."

⁷ In *KT*, and in this paper, I do not draw any distinction between states of affairs that are *good for* individuals and states that are directly contributory to their *well-being* and/or *welfare*.

⁸ I defend a position that entails *KT* in my [omitted for blind review]

⁹ For Velleman see, for example, McMahan (2002) 473-85, Kamm (1999) and for Anderson see, for example, Piper (1996) and Sturgeon (1996).

conflict with *KT*, in fact, they seem to support it. The problem is not that these are terrible arguments. Rather, the issue, I will suggest, is that adherents of *KT* and those who believe that welfare can be unconditionally valuable have different ways of classifying *evaluative* claims. My suggestion is nearly confirmed when we then examine direct responses to *KT* by non-adherents. Finally, I explain why this is not a merely a case of philosophers inefficiently “speaking past one another,” or disagreeing in name but not in substance. Rather, and more disturbing, I’ll explain why the difference in taxonomy renders many philosophers effectively blind to the possibility that *KT* is true, and needlessly commits ethical theory to an impoverished and distorted set of options.

KT as a Plausible and Powerful Thesis

KT has a lot going for it. For example, it accounts well for when, how, and why the *good for* relation is a good-maker. Notice that the mere fact that a state is *good for* something does not, by itself, support or entail that that state is *good*. A state may be good for mold, a virus, a corporation, or the devil, but the realization of that state does not thereby improve the world. Likewise, some states may be good for us, but the fact that they are does not by itself entail that they are good, or that there is even a defeasible reason to realize these states.¹⁰ A misanthrope can happily accept that some states are good for people, but deny that he has any reason to realize such states. Claims that a state is good for someone or something lack the particular normative character present in claims that a state is simply good.¹¹ Even the

¹⁰ For a further defense of this claim see Darwall (2002): 6.

¹¹ The fact that good states *per se* automatically entail that there’s some basis for realizing them, does not provide any evidence to support the conclusion that those specific states which happen to be good are unconditionally or independently good. If the value of states depends on the value of individuals, being a good state will still (conceptually) entail that there are grounds for realizing that state. However, the states that are good will be so in virtue of there being valuable individuals.

misanthrope cannot consistently judge that a state is good and deny that there is any basis for realizing the state.

Though being *good for* someone or something does not entail being *good*, there is (at least) a tight connection between being good and being good for someone or something. Just about every state-type thought to be good is in fact good for someone or something, and indeed, some have thought there is something suspicious about the very idea that a state of affairs could be good, but not good for anyone. But how can a state be good because it is good for an individual despite the fact that, as we have seen, many such states are not good at all? Why does being good for an individual make a state valuable in some cases, but not in others? How and when can a state gain an unqualified normative character in virtue of being good for some individual —a feature which does not, itself, possess such a character?

The Kantian Thesis suggests a simple and compelling answer: states can be good in virtue of being good for some individual only when the relevant individual is valuable, specifically only when that individual *merits concern*. Persons, for example, are thought to have a special status that mold, viruses, and corporations do not. Most of us believe that persons merit concern and we typically deny that mold, viruses, and corporations and the Devil merit concern. Consequently, states cannot be good merely in virtue of being good for mold, viruses, a corporation, or the Devil; but they can be good in virtue of being good for persons.

Of course, one might worry that the Kantian Thesis provides a vacuous explanation as to when and why well-being is good —isn't caring for someone or thinking that she merits care *just the same thing as* thinking that her well-being is good? No. Imagine a civil servant at the Department of Human Welfare who is so consumed by his work that he becomes deeply concerned with, and non-instrumentally and single-mindedly aims to promote, human

welfare. We can coherently imagine that such a person does not care for anybody nor does he think anyone merits concern. Instead, he is just singularly values those states that promote human welfare. To such a person, it would make sense to add happy people to the world so as to promote aggregate human welfare or to kill anyone of less than average well-being so as to promote average human welfare. Surely these acts don't count as being performed for our (humanity's) sake. When we promote an individual's welfare, *for that individual's sake*, an attitude towards that individual underlies our aim. Typically, this attitude is care.¹² Caring for someone is incompatible with denying that her welfare matters. But our civil servant case reveals that caring for someone, or thinking that she merits care, isn't merely valuing her welfare.

The civil servant case also illustrates how *KT* has different substantial implications than the view that states of human well-being are unconditionally valuable. As Anderson notes, *KT* can uniquely and readily explain why the world is not improved by the mere addition of happy people, the subtraction of people who are less well-off than average, or the addition of miserable people who happen to fare better than everyone else already in existence.¹³ Elsewhere, I build on Anderson's case, and explain why *KT* may be the key to finally developing a theory of beneficence that can at once avoid Parfit's famous "Repugnant Conclusion" and "Non-Identity Problem" –all while preserving the transitivity of the *better than* relation.¹⁴

So given *KT*'s initial appeal and its substantive promise, its neglect is curious. Most of us believe that people merit concern. Why not help ourselves to this assumption to

¹² Sometimes it seems *respect* for the individual may be operative. An individual can fare so poorly that it undermines her agency; consider individuals who are depressed, malnourished, or impoverished. In these cases respect for such individuals appears to commit me to wanting that their welfare improve.

¹³ Anderson [1993]: 26-30.

¹⁴ See my "How to Use Kant as a Means to Parfit's "Theory x"

explain when and why states that are good for us are good? Why do theorists often overlook the possibility that such states are good because we merit concern? We will get a clue to the answer when we examine some characteristic arguments for the “unconditional” value of pleasure and well-being. Of course, for most theorists, states of pleasure and states of well-being are distinct. Nevertheless, pleasure will be a constituent of most theories of well-being. And if we must conclude that states of pleasure can be independently valuable, KT looks (at least) threatened.

Indirect Arguments against KT

As it turns out, the types of arguments historically advanced for the “unconditional” goodness of pleasure or well-being do not threaten *KT*. In fact, they seem to support it. Let’s briefly examine some of these arguments.

Instances of pleasure are sometimes said to be unconditionally good because their goodness is immediately evident in our experience of them. It is hard to know what we could possibly discern about *why* instances of pleasure are good from reflecting on the phenomenology. The experience itself does not somehow inform us that pleasure is good independently of the value of the subject. Instead, if experiencing pleasure immediately informs us of anything it is that such experiences are intrinsically enjoyable or make immediate contributions to our well-being. Perhaps such experiences are by their very nature good for their bearers, and hence worth wanting non-instrumentally for the sake of the subjects that experience them. Thomas Nagel concludes that states of pleasure are good for this sort of reason.¹⁵ However, if we claim that pleasure is by its nature the sort of thing that one would want *for the sake of* the subject that experiences it, then we claim that it is

¹⁵ Nagel argues that pleasurable consciousness is good because we find it intrinsically agreeable. Nagel (1986): chapter 8.

something we should want out of care (or perhaps *respect*, or *love*) for the subject. But how could that possibly be a good making feature of pleasurable states if the relevant subject did not merit care (or love, or respect)? Furthermore, if we simply thought that states of pleasure were valuable in itself, it would make sense to try to maximize pleasure by producing many animals and stimulating their pleasure centers. It's that kind of thinking directly generates the Repugnant Conclusion, and distorts how we think about pleasure's value.

Irwin Goldstein gives his own case for the independent value of pleasure. He argues that pleasure is independently valuable because we each have an intrinsic *preference* for it.¹⁶ Here we have an appeal to the idea that our pro-attitude towards a state can make that state good. But, again, why would *that* be a good-making feature unless you also thought that we merit concern? So, despite Goldstein's characterization of his conclusion—that pleasure is independently valuable—nothing in his argument suggests that states of pleasure are good independently of individuals that merit concern. Instead, his paper apparently aims to demonstrate that states of pleasure are good independent of their relation to other *goods*. If that is so, Goldstein seems to assume, without argument, that the valuable is exhausted by the good (i.e. the desirable or preferable). And so the question of whether pleasure would be good even if the subjects of pleasure do not merit concern does not come up.

L.W. Sumner urges that well-being is independently valuable, and that welfare's goodness can function as the foundation for all other evaluative and moral facts. Sumner suggests that if there is a single foundational value it must have four features. First, "it would have to be intrinsic, worth having or pursuing for its own sake, not merely by virtue

¹⁶ Irwin Goldstein (1989): 255-276.

of some further good with which it is connected or associated.”¹⁷ Second, it must be “abstract or generic”; if there is a single foundational value that encompasses our ordinary judgments about what is good and explains their appeal, then nothing short of an abstract category or mode of value will have this degree of generality.¹⁸ Third, the value in question must be important. And fourth, it must be ethically salient; it must be a value that could serve as the basis for a moral theory.¹⁹

Sumner argues that welfare meets all these conditions.²⁰ He says that welfare’s value is *intrinsic* because benefits and harms matter in their own right, and not merely as a means to further ends. It is *generic* because most goods can be understood as contributory to individual well-being. And he claims it is *important* because it tracks the way in which individuals’ lives go well or badly in their own eyes, or from their point of view. Finally, he thinks it is ethically salient. Here he asks “if something will improve the conditions of no one’s life, make no one better off, then what reason could be given for recommending it?”²¹ Later he concludes that treating welfare as a single foundational value, explains why moral considerations matter. They matter “because it matters how well lives are going, and how well the lives of other creatures are going must matter to us because it matters (from the inside) to those creatures.”²²

Nothing in this argument suggests that well-being is good independent of individuals that merit care. And it is no surprise because Sumner, like Goldstein, seems to argue under

¹⁷ Sumner (1996): 190.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid: 191.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid:192

²² Ibid: 217. Interestingly, it appears that Sumner’s justification for welfarism is self-defeating. If welfare matters because it is important or ethically salient because it matters *to* welfare subjects, then presumably anything that matters, in the relevant way, *to* welfare subjects is important or ethically salient. And it’s a near-platitude, I think, that more can matter *to* us than our welfare. And Sumner’s view does not entail that anything that matters to us is constitutive of our welfare.

the assumption that value and goodness are identical. First, he describes intrinsic value as “worth having or pursuing for its own sake.” And second, he thinks that the burden of showing that welfare is the foundational value turns on whether he can show that the value of other *goods* is explained by the value of welfare. But showing that the goodness of all states depends on the value of welfare states is not demonstrating that welfare is the foundational value, at least not unless one already assumes that the only kind of value is the goodness of states of affairs.

Sumner claims that welfare matters because it matters to the individuals who would enjoy it. But that is not always true, not even on a broad characterization of “mattering to.” The welfare of merely prospective individuals does not matter to those individuals. So it is not welfare states *per se* that matter, and if it were, Sumner’s view would never be able to avoid the classical population paradoxes. As Sumner suggests himself, what matters is what matters to or for individuals. And it seems as though there is no reason to believe *that* if you deny that individuals merit concern (or love or respect). Sumner’s argument does not challenge *KT*, it supports it.

Given that Sumner, like Goldstein, appears to conflate the good and the valuable, we might suspect that he may believe *KT*, but deny that claims that certain individuals merit concern count as evaluative claims. And so, he might believe that our welfare is good because we merit concern, but deny that this entails that the goodness of states depends on the *value* of individuals. In that case, the difference between Sumner and adherents of *KT* may merely be about how they choose to classify kinds of normative claims. This diagnosis cannot be correct. Notice that Sumner cannot claim that the value welfare provides the foundation for all other moral and evaluative facts if *it* has value only because we merit

concern or respect. Sumner has not refuted the Kantian option; instead he seems somehow blind to it.

Sumner and Goldstein's arguments purport to show that some states are good independent of the value of anything else; but they really show (at best) that some or all states of personal well-being are *intrinsically* or *non-instrumentally* good. But successful arguments that well-being is intrinsically or non-instrumentally good do not challenge *KT*. A state can be intrinsically or non-instrumentally good even though its goodness depends on the fact that some individual merits concern or respect. For example, perhaps *my being happy* is good independently of its relation to other good states. If so, it is a non-derivative or non-instrumental good. But being non-instrumentally good does not entail being good independently of the value of any other items. Rather, it only entails being good independently of the value of *any other state*. For the adherent of *KT*, *my being happy* is good independently of the goodness of any other state, but its being good in this way depends on the fact that I merit concern. Furthermore, if *my being happy* is good only because I merit concern, its goodness is still intrinsic. An item is intrinsically good if its goodness is explained solely by its intrinsic features.²³ I am an intrinsic constituent of the state of affairs that is *my being happy*, and presumably I merit concern in virtue of my intrinsic features. Therefore, the value of *my being happy* would depend on my value, but the state would nevertheless be intrinsically valuable.

Direct Rejections of KT

²³ See Moore (1951): 260 and Feldman (1997): 136-39. For defense of this account, see Bradley (2002). There are other accounts, some of which understand intrinsic value to be valuable independent of the value of anything else. On those views a state's being of "intrinsic" value would be inconsistent with *KT*. For a discussion of the various views on intrinsic value, or perhaps more aptly the various uses of 'intrinsic value' see Zimmerman (2004).

Direct arguments against *KT*'s supposition that persons could have value also miss their target. Noah Lemos, for example, explicitly rejects that people could be the bearers of intrinsic value. But look at his reason why:

...the mere fact that there are persons does not seem to be desirable in and for itself or intrinsically good. But if the fact that there are persons is not intrinsically good, then it seems reasonable to believe that persons are not intrinsically good, since if individual persons had intrinsic value, the fact that they exist would be intrinsically good.²⁴

Lemos' argument relies on the idea that if something is intrinsically valuable then it is non-instrumentally good if it exists. Here again we get an implicit identification of good and the valuable. And interestingly, Lemos is using a claim that some adherents of *KT* explicitly accept (“it is not good that persons exist”) to argue that individuals, or at least persons, cannot have value.

What we have here is a Failure to Communicate?

At this point, the proponent of *KT* could try to claim that Noah Lemos, L.W. Sumner, and Irwin Goldstein have no any idea what value is. And conversely Noah Lemos, L.W. Sumner, and Irwin Goldstein could claim that Elizabeth Anderson and David Velleman are confused. That would be a pointless debate. As Ben Bradley puts it, there are “two conceptions of intrinsic value.”²⁵ These conceptions of value are not competing attempts to describe the nature of a single ethical property. Instead one view is concerned with what

²⁴ Lemos (1994): 28

²⁵ Bradley (2006) In fact, it is this paper that directed me to Lemos' argument. Bradley uses it, and now I have borrowed it from him, to illustrate how Kantian and Moorean conflicts about value may not be substantive.

treatment or attitudes items can merit, Bradley calls this the “Kantian Conception.”²⁶ And a second view is concerned with the good, the desirable, and/or which objects’ existence make the world better, Bradley calls this the “Moorean Conception.”

Drawing a distinction between the Kantian and Moorean conceptions of value allows us to make sense of Sumner’s and Goldstein’s arguments. On a Moorean conception of value, to be valuable *just is* to be good, and so arguing that a state is non-derivatively good is arguing that it has independent value. Such theorists can simultaneously acknowledge that facts about the goodness of states depend on facts that certain individuals merit concern, provided that the later type of claim is not described as an attribution of “value” to an individual. So maybe all parties can agree after all?

Not quite. Although, strictly speaking, the Moorean account is itself compatible with *KT*, adhering to the Moorean conception of value is the primary reason why theorists like Sumner understandably neglect it. Adopting the Moorean conception of value and two widely held assumptions forces anyone to exclude, without warrant, the possibility that *KT* could be true. As we will see, it is probably responsible for other biases within our moral and evaluative discourse as well.

The widely held assumptions are: I. Normative claims come in two fundamental varieties: deontic and evaluative, and, II. Evaluative facts often cannot be explained by deontic facts. Deontic claims express a normative relation between an object, typically an action, and an agent or agents. They can be expressed by *ought*, *obligation*, and *reason* claims; consequently the truth of any such claims appears to require the presence of an agent. Evaluative facts do not work like that; the world may be worse for being full of miserable

²⁶ Unfortunately, Bradley sometimes characterizes the Kantian Conception as concerned with how we ought to treat or regard individuals. As we will see in a moment, characterizing the Kantian Conception in this way is a mistake.

animals even if there is no agent present in that world, and hence even if no ought, or has reason, to do anything. Because evaluative claims can be true even when no one ought, has reason, or is required to do anything, if there is any metaphysical priority between the evaluative and deontic, the evaluative must have priority. In fact, many take it to be a sort of conceptual truth that instances of value purport to explain why there are any reasons or deontic facts at all—they are the normative ground that justifies particular deontic claims.

Now look at the mess the Moorean conception makes: If we adopt the Moorean conception of value, and subscribe to the common views that *there are only deontic and evaluative normative facts* and *deontic facts cannot explain why states are good*, then claims that certain individuals merit concern have no place to go. They are not claims about what is good. So if one were to place them anywhere they would fall in the deontic category. But if claims that certain individuals merit concern or respect are understood as deontic claims, they are not suitable candidates for explaining why states of individual well-being are good. States of affairs can be good independently of whether an agent exists; deontic claims cannot be true if no agent exists. Therefore, a state's goodness cannot always depend on the truth of deontic claims. As it turns out, this is exactly how some contemporary Mooreans respond to *KT*. Michael Zimmerman, who defends the view that only states can have intrinsic value, dismisses Anderson's position because he contends her claims about the "value" of individuals are really just claims about how we *ought* to treat individuals, and not evaluative claims at all.²⁷ Bradley, himself, unintentionally rigs the debate by sometimes describing the Kantian conception of value as a view about how we *ought* to treat or regard individuals. Characterizing the Kantian Conception in this way is a mistake.

²⁷ See Zimmerman (2001): 45

Claims that certain individuals merit concern or respect are no more deontic than claims that certain states merit realization or are good. Saying that something merits care is not the same thing as claiming one ought to care for it. These claims have different truth conditions. We can imagine worlds where no individual is cognitively equipped to care for any other individuals (a world full of infants is probably such a world) and still insist that the individuals in that world merit concern. But in such a world it is false that anyone *ought* to be shown concern, because nobody *can* show them concern. Further, meriting care is not the same as being such that one ought to care, if one can. If I promise a plant-loving friend that I will really care for (and not merely tend to) his plants while he is away, then I ought to care for his plants. But that fact alone does not entail that the plants themselves merit care.²⁸

So the Moorean conception, plus some standard claims about the role that value plays in a normative theory, seem to render Mooreans blind to a wide range of moral and evaluative theories. Lemos' argument against the value of persons, and Zimmerman's response to Anderson suggest that blindness rather than providing genuine grounds for privileging the Moorean conception. *KT* allows us to explain which items have the kind of value the Moorean is concerned about and why. But the relationship is not symmetric.

If we accept the Moorean conception of value, and subscribe to the plausible idea that deontic facts are to be explained by reference to value, it does not make much sense to be anything but a consequentialist and it does not make sense to look for normative explanations as to why we must realize whichever states are "intuited" to be of intrinsic value. In fact, on such a view we cannot capture our seemingly fundamental conviction

²⁸ It may be that meriting an attitude and evaluative facts generally, just are a special kind of deontic fact. For example, perhaps an object is valuable just when you ought to value it if you are in position to value it, and features of that object by themselves explain why you ought to value it if you are in position to value it. Even that view does not preclude the possibility that the deontic depends on the evaluative, because all other deontic facts could depend on the special type of deontic facts that characterize the evaluative.

that people merit care. The fact that we merit care would have to be explained by or equivalent to some fact that certain states are good.²⁹ But there can be no such relation. It cannot be true, for example, that humans merit concern because states of human welfare are good. If human welfare is good, then we might have an instrumental reason to care for humans, if caring for them maximized their well-being. But having an instrumental reason to care for humans does not entail that we merit care. If humans merit care, there is a reason to care for them regardless of whether doing so would maximize human wellbeing. Moreover, there can be contexts where not caring for others would maximize well-being. In those contexts, well-being's goodness cannot explain why there is a reason to care for people, and *a fortiori*, it cannot explain why people merit care.

So I do not think there is much to said for identifying the good and valuable, and hence the Moorean conception of value. But, of course, it is open to Mooreans to *stipulate* that when they theorize about value they are exclusively concerned with the good. If they do so, they are not entitled to set aside claims that certain individuals merit concern as mere deontological claims about how individuals ought to be treated. Instead they have to confront the possibility that Moorean value depends upon a species of non-deontic normative facts that certain individuals merit concern. Confronting this possibility, I believe, will finally give them their long-sought, extensionally adequate, and well-motivated axiology for well-being. The price, however, will be a commitment to reject the idea that reasons and the right are a mere function of the good.

²⁹ For example, claiming that *something merits care* is not the same thing as claiming that *the state of my caring for it would be good*. Consider again the world full of helpless infants with no one to care for them. If I were added to such a world but remained unable to assist the infants (suppose, perhaps, that I was somehow caged or incapacitated) I don't see why it would be good or make the world any better were I to care for them, although the infants presumably continue to merit care.

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