Suppose I am deliberating whether or not to buy a plane ticket to visit an exotic country. Would I be rational to do so? Obviously, we have not said enough to answer this question. We can however ask a different, broader, question: what general principles and what sorts of information are required to determine whether or not my buying the ticket is a rational choice? This course will explore answers to this question, with special attention to their philosophical underpinnings. The course has three parts: Part I: we will motivate and develop a framework that philosophers (as well as gamblers, economists, mathematicians and computer scientists) have used to represent various theories of rational-decision making. This framework is probabilistic, but it will be a central concern to introduce it without presupposing more than high-school algebra and elementary logic (of the sort one learns in Phil 150). Part II: we will elaborate on puzzles and paradoxes that have arisen surrounding the various theories of rational decision (we focus in particular on two famous paradoxes: Newcomb’s paradox and the Allais paradox) Part III: we will study the works of major philosophers (B. Pascal, D. Davidson, D. Lewis, F. Jackson) with an eye to questions regarding the philosophical significance of decision theory. Can a decision-theoretic argument be given for religious belief (as Pascal suggested)? What is the relation between decision-theory and ethics? Can the concept of rationality captured by decision-theory help us understand the concepts of belief, desire and preference?