This course is designed to provide a thorough reading of the basic conceptions in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The seminar will also try to complement the reading with hints at repercussions of Kant's ideas and argumentative structures in more recent philosophical debates. Examples are: Kant qualified his philosophy as "transcendental idealism and empirical realism". This position, according to Kant, tries to avoid having to choose between saying that we must have an unconceptualized access to reality in order to have factual knowledge and saying that the reality we come to consider as the object of our factual knowledge is determined by our concepts. Kant's way out seems to suggest that this is a non-issue because we only have one set of concepts that constitutes the form of human experience in general. Does Kant's analysis of the impasse and his indication of the way out still have something to tell even though his specific solutions (one set of forms of all possible objects of experience, one set of categories to form judgments, one set of principles to form natural laws) may have become doubtful? Where do criticisms of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy leave Kant (or where does Kant leave them)? Much of modern and contemporary philosophy of mind centers on the question of the relation between mind and reality. Kant criticized all attempts at founding factual knowledge on self-knowledge (which lead into "paralogisms") or knowledge of unconceptualised reality in itself (which lead to "antinomies"). Both have to be presupposed, but can't become objects of factual knowledge themselves. Does this dissolve the problems of mind and reality or rather make them cognitively insolvable?