

KYLA EBELS-DUGGAN

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ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 2013-present
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 2007-2013
Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Fellow, Center for Human Values, Princeton University, 2009-2010
Weinberg College Fellow (Tenure Track Position), Northwestern University, 2006-2007

EDUCATION

Harvard University, Ph.D., Philosophy, March 2007
Dissertation: *Giving Reasons: Interpersonal Relationships and the Conditions of Autonomy*
Committee: Christine M. Korsgaard (chair), T.M. Scanlon, Gisela Striker and Melissa Barry
University of Michigan, B.A., Highest Distinction, Highest Honors in Philosophy, May 1998

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Kant's Practical Philosophy, Philosophy of Education

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

History of Ethics, Applied Ethics, Philosophy of Religion

POST-DOCTORAL AWARDS AND LEAVES OF ABSENCE

Visiting Fellowship at the Center for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs
St Andrews University, Scotland, April-June 2014
Spencer Foundation Initiative on Philosophy in Educational Policy and Practice Grant
Funding for research leave, April 2012-March 2013
Laurance S. Rockefeller Fellowship at the Princeton Center for Human Values
Funding for research leave, August 2009-July 2010
Visiting Faculty Fellowship at the Center for Ethics at the University of Toronto
Funding for research leave during academic year 2009-2010
Declined to accept Rockefeller Fellowship.

PRE-DOCTORAL AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

George Plimpton Adams Prize for outstanding dissertation (2007)
Whiting Dissertation Completion Fellowship (2004-2005)
Edmond J. Safra Fellowship, Center for Ethics and the Professions at Harvard University (2003-2004)
Francis Bowen Prize for the Best Paper in Moral or Political Philosophy (2004): "The Hobbesian Agent and the Bondage of Self-interest"
Francis Bowen Prize (2003): "Inner Freedom and Required Ends"
Bechtel Prize for the Best Philosophy Paper (2002): "Acting Together: Negotiation, Coercion and Joint Decision-Making"
Francis Bowen Prize (2001): "Disagreement and Liberal Commitment"
Harvey Fellowship (2001-2005)
Harvard Graduate Society Summer Fellowship (2001)
Derek Bok Center Certificate of Excellence in Teaching (2000, 2003)
William K. Frankena Award for Most Outstanding Graduate in Philosophy (1998)
Virginia Vos Award for Excellence in Academic Writing (1998)
National Finalist, British Marshall Scholarship (1997)
Elsa L. Haller Award for Best Undergraduate Paper in Philosophy (1997)
Otto Graf Scholarship for Most Outstanding Junior in the Honors College (1997)
Phi Beta Kappa (1997)
National Merit Scholar (1994)

PUBLICATIONS

“The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair: (Kantian) Ethics and the Need for Hope in God,” forthcoming in *Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*.

Kant rejects all of the standard accounts of the dependence of morality on religious claims or commitment. He nevertheless thinks that morality “leads to” religion. I defend an account of this “leading to” relationship, arguing that it is the result of his struggle to characterize the normative import of happiness.

“Autonomy as Intellectual Virtue,” forthcoming in *The Aims of Higher Education*, Harry Brighouse and Michael MacPherson, eds.

Many thinkers agree that facilitating the development of students’ autonomy is a proper aim of education generally and higher education in particular. I defend a version of the autonomy view, but not as I think its other advocates imagine it. I suggest that an important aim of education is the facilitation of intellectual virtues. What is right about the idea that education should facilitate students’ autonomy is best captured in virtue terms as intellectual charity and humility.

“Educating for Autonomy: An Old-fashioned View,” forthcoming in *Social Philosophy and Policy*.

I argue that we cannot adequately characterize the aims of education in terms of narrowly intellectual virtues or some formal conception of what it is to think well. Implementing any such aim requires reliance on and communication of further, substantive normative commitments. This reveals that a standard contrast between an old-fashioned approach to education that aims to communicate a particular normative outlook, and a progressive approach that aims to develop skills of critical reasoning and reflection is confused and misleading. I begin by elaborating the two models and characterizing the apparent opposition between them as arising from disagreement over the value of autonomy. I then consider and reject several attempts to specify the conception of autonomy over which advocates of the two models disagree. I argue that the disagreement is better understood as concerning the content of a properly educated person’s convictions, and conclude that the second model is not an alternative to, but rather an instance of, the first.

“Moral Education in the Liberal State,” *Journal of Practical Ethics*, 1:2, December 2013, 34-63.

I argue that political liberals should not support the monopoly of a single curriculum or educational approach in state sponsored schools. Instead, they should allow reasonable citizens latitude to choose the worldview in which their own children are educated. I begin by defending a particular conception of political liberalism, and its associated requirement of public reason, against the received interpretation. Next I argue that no single educational approach can meet the standard of justification that results. Finally, I address two objections to my favored alternative: that it may allow for the inculcation of disrespect, and that it violates children’s autonomy. Against the first, I claim that political liberals have no grounds for thinking that reasonable citizens will seek to inculcate disrespect. Finally, I argue that there is no conception of autonomy that can sustain the second.

“Dealing With the Past: Responsibility and Personal History,” *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 164:1, 2013, 141-161.

I argue that unfortunate formative circumstances do not undermine the warrant for either responsibility or blame. I then diagnose the tendency to think that formative circumstances do matter in this way, arguing that knowledge of these circumstances can play an essential epistemic role in our interpersonal interactions.

“Kant’s Political Philosophy,” *Philosophy Compass* vol. 7:12, November 2012, 896-909.

In the first half of the essay I give a reading of Kant’s argument for the obligation to found the state: Each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. Since we are obligated to respect each person’s right to freedom, and can do so only in a state, we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (1) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (2) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (3) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (4) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions?

“Kantian Ethics,” in Christian Miller, ed. *The Continuum Companion to Ethics*, (Continuum 2012).

I articulate and defend the most central claims of contemporary Kantian moral theory. I also explain some of the most important internal disagreements in the field. I begin by trying to dispel common misinterpretations of the Kantian program, arising largely from misreadings of Kant’s *Groundwork I*. Then I contrast two approaches to Kantian ethics: Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Realism. I connect the former to Kant’s Formula of Universal Law and the latter to his Formula of Humanity. I end by discussing applications of the Formula of Humanity in normative ethics. I outline some normative commitments that most Kantians share and then discuss differences between Constructivists and Realists over how the formula ought to be applied.

“Kantianism” in *The Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics*. 2nd edition. (Elsevier 2012).

This article focuses largely on Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* in which he articulates several purportedly equivalent candidates for the fundamental moral principle, the Categorical Imperative. These formulations invoke, respectively, the ideas of universalization, respect for humanity, a kingdom of ends, and autonomy. Kant defends the authority of this principle, seeking to show that any rational agent must guide herself by it. I also discuss Kant’s later moral works in which he defends government authority, develops a theory of virtue, and argues that moral commitment leads the rational person to religious commitment.

“Critical Notice of Arthur Ripstein’s *Force and Freedom*” (article length, peer reviewed), *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 41:4, December 2011, 549-573.

Ripstein’s Kantian argument for the authority of the state purports to demonstrate that state authority is a necessary condition of each individual’s freedom. Ripstein regards an individual as free just in case her entitlement to control what is hers is not violated. After questioning whether his approach adequately distinguishes standards of legitimacy from standards of ideal justice, I argue for the superiority of an alternative conception of freedom. On the view that I defend a person is free just in case she is able to move her body in space unimpeded by others. I argue that this conception allows for a more convincing version of the Kantian argument.

“Awarding Custody: Children’s Interests and the Fathers’ Rights Movement,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, vol. 24:4, October 2010, 257-278.

Child custody cases in the United States are usually settled by appeal to what is taken to be in the children’s best interests. A growing movement for fathers’ rights asserts that an explicit recognition of parental rights should replace this practice, and further that this should lead us to favor split custody arrangements. I argue for the first part of the claim, appealing to the fundamental commitments of political liberalism. But I argue against the idea that this should make a 50/50 split the default custody arrangement. I explain how this proposal would license ongoing, intrusive state intervention, and so undermine the very parental rights it aims to recognize.

“The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement,” *The Philosophical Quarterly* vol. 60:238, January 2010, 50-71.

I argue that Rawls’ requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies that they believe can be justified in public reason depends on a certain ideal for the relationships between citizens. I affirm the value of this ideal, and thus hold that citizens have reasons to try to achieve it. But I argue that it is not always possible to find the common ground that we would need to do so, and thus reject Rawls’ strong claim that we have an *obligation* to defend our views in public reason.

“Moral Community: Escaping the Ethical State of Nature,” *Philosophers’ Imprint* vol. 9:8, August 2009.

I attempt to vindicate our authority to create new practical reasons for others by making choices of our own. In *The Doctrine of Right* Kant argues that we have an obligation to leave the Juridical State of Nature and found the state. In a less familiar passage in *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason* he argues for an obligation to leave what he calls the Ethical State of Nature and join together in the Moral Community. I read both texts as addressing and trying to resolve a tension between our individual freedom and our authority to make claims on one another. I explicate the political argument, and then develop the view that Kant sketches in the *Religion*, arguing that regarding others as capable of making choices that give you reasons to act is a condition of the full exercise of your autonomy.

“Against Beneficence: A Normative Account of Love,” *Ethics* vol. 119:1, October 2008, 142-170.

I argue that rather than aiming at the well-being of those whom we love, we should aim to share in their ends. The former stance runs the risk of being objectionably paternalistic and, as I explain, only the latter makes reciprocal relationships possible. I end by diagnosing our attraction to the idea that we should promote our loved-ones’ well-being.

Book Reviews

Thomas E. Hill, *Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations*. Forthcoming in *Mind*.

Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly, *All Things Shining. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, September 9, 2011.

Bennett Helm, *Love, Friendship and the Self. Ethics* vol. 121:4, July 2011, 808-812.

WORKS IN PROGRESS

“Kant on Freedom and Moral Education” (A revised version will appear under a different title in *The Oxford Handbook of Freedom*, David Schmidtz, ed)

I consider the possibility of moral education in light of two apparent problems: First, it seems to require that we have a causal influence on another’s will, but such influence seems incompatible with the very idea of a will. Second, the influence to which moral education subjects people risks being objectionably coercive. I argue that we can simultaneously resolve both issues by understanding the influence of moral education as rational rather than causal. I also argue that our need and ability to appreciate reasons, and the obstacles that we face in doing so, provide a crucial bridge between a conception of ourselves as radically free and as susceptible to empirical influence.

“Anselmian Moral Skepticism”

Many contemporary moral philosophers think that it is a mistake to take moral skepticism seriously. I argue that there are many different skeptical challenges to morality that one might raise, and some are worth engaging. In fact, an acknowledged inability to answer a certain kind of moral skepticism is a serious problem for moral theory.

“Talking us Through It: Moral Testimony and Moral Development”

Reliance on moral testimony can seem both as if it must and as if it could not be problematic. I offer a view about moral testimony that explains both. The view depends on a distinction between moral, or more generally ethical, *knowledge* on the one hand, and moral, or more generally ethical, *appreciation* on the other. Moral or ethical appreciation is a matter of seeing the world in a certain way, and so outstrips propositional knowledge. Moral testimony can convey knowledge, but not appreciation. Moreover, since appreciation is an important aspect of moral maturity, testimony alone is inadequate for moral education, though it standardly plays a central role.

“Inner Freedom and Required Ends”

I argue for a more robust role for required positive ends within a Kantian moral theory than others have acknowledged. Reason must give us a task to work towards, not merely limit our actions, if we are to be free in Kant’s own sense. I explicate the relevant sense of freedom, give some reasons for supposing that Kant endorses the claim, and finally reconstruct his arguments for it.

PRESENTATIONS

“Moral Community: Escaping the Ethical State of Nature”

Georgetown Moral Innovation Seminar, Washington DC, October 2014

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, September 2005

“Kant on Freedom and the Development of Character”

Keynote Address, Conference on Kantian Freedom, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, BC, October 2014

UK Kant Society Conference on Kant and Society, Lancaster, England, UK, July 2009

“The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair: (Kantian) Ethics and the Need for Hope in God”
University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Scotland, UK, April 2014
University of Illinois-Chicago, Chicago, IL, April 2014
University of Notre Dame, South Bend IN, December 2013
Baylor University, Waco TX, February 2013

“Christian Philosophy and the Christian Life”
Keynote Address, Society of Christian Philosophers Midwest Regional Meeting Palos Heights, IL,
March 2014

“What Philosophy of Education Can Teach Us about the Virtues”
Conference on Education: Ideals and Practices Park City, UT, August 2013
Conference on Educating for Intellectual Virtues Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, June
2013

“Autonomy as Intellectual Virtue”
Honors Residential College, Baylor University, Waco TX, February 2013
*Spencer Foundation Conference on Achieving the Aims of Higher Education: Problems of Morality and
Justice* Evanston IL, October 2011
*Spencer Foundation Workshop on Achieving the Aims of Higher Education: Problems of Morality and
Justice* Chicago IL, June 2011

“Kant on Morality, Happiness, and Religion”
Baylor-Georgetown-Notre Dame Conference on Philosophy of Religion, San Antonio, TX, November 2012
Southern North American Kant Society, Tulsa OK, September 2012
International Symposium on the Foundations of Morality, Wuhan, China, October 2011
Felician Ethics Conference, Rutherford NJ, April 2011
Wheaton College Philosophy Speaker Series, Wheaton IL, January 2011

“Dealing with the Past: Responsibility and Personal History”
Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder CO, August 2012
Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Bellingham WA, July 2012
University of Chicago Practical Workshop, Chicago IL, December 2011
Indiana University, Bloomington IN, March 2010
Mid-Atlantic Reading Group in Ethics, New York NY, February, 2010
Fellows Seminar, Center for Human Values, Princeton University, Princeton NJ, February 2010

“Moral Education in the Liberal State”
The Society for Applied Philosophy Conference, Oxford, England, UK June 2012
The Virtue of Justice Conference, Conway AR, March 2012
Northwestern Practical Philosophy Workshop, Evanston IL, May 2011
Vanderbilt Political Theory Workshop, Nashville TN, September 2010
Northeastern Political Science Association Meeting, Philadelphia, PA, November 2009

“Taking Responsibility”
American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago IL, February 2010
Conference on Developing Character: Moral and Intellectual Virtues, Dubuque IA, March 2007
Grand Valley State University, Allendale MI, March 2007
Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, Conference on Modernity, South Bend IN, November 2006

“Anselmian Moral Skepticism”
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee WI, April 2009
University of British Columbia, Vancouver BC, January 2009
Baylor University, Waco TX, December 2008

“Children’s Interests and the Fathers’ Rights Movement”
American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago IL, February 2009
Grand Valley State University Philosophy Club, Allendale MI, March 2007
Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, April 2006

“Inner Freedom and Required Ends”

North American Kant Society Midwest Study Group, Milwaukee WI, November 2006
Boston University, Graduate Student Conference on Kant, Boston MA, April 2004
Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, February 2003

“Against Beneficence”

Northwestern University, Evanston IL, February 2006
University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign, Champaign IL, February 2006
University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Amherst MA, February 2006
University of Vermont, Burlington VT, February 2006
Bowdoin College, Brunswick ME, February 2006
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia PA, February 2006
University of Notre Dame, South Bend IN, January 2006
University of Western Ontario, London ON, January 2006
MIT Workshop on Gender and Philosophy, Cambridge MA, January 2006
Harvard Department of Philosophy, Cambridge MA, November 2005

“Relationships as Sharing Ends”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, April 2005

“The Problem with Taking Care of What We Care About”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, October 2004

“The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement”

Center for Ethics and the Professions, Harvard University, Cambridge MA, May 2004

“Sovereign Autonomy and Interpersonal Authority”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, April 2004

“Conservative Christians as Political Liberals”

Baylor University, Conference on Christianity and the Soul of the University, Waco TX, March 2004

“The Hobbesian Agent and the Bondage of Self-Interest”

Center for Ethics and the Professions, Harvard University, Cambridge MA, January 2004

“Two States of Nature”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, October 2003

“Autonomy and Others’ Authority”

University of California-Irvine, Graduate Student Colloquium, Irvine CA, November 2002

“Acting Together: Negotiation, Coercion, and Joint Decision-Making”

University of California-Irvine, Graduate Student Colloquium, Irvine CA, May 2002
University of California-Los Angeles Workshop in Moral Philosophy, Los Angeles CA, May 2002

“Commitment to Principles and Persons”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, October 2001

“Disagreement and Liberal Commitment”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, February 2001

COMMENTS

Allen Wood's "Universal Law"

Paton Colloquium in Kantian Ethics, St Andrews, Scotland, UK, May 2014

Patrick Kain's "Good, God, and Kant"

Baylor-Georgetown-Notre Dame Conference on Philosophy of Religion, South Bend, IN, October 2013

Ian MacMullen's, "Status Quo Bias," *Civics Beyond Critics*, Chapter 7.

Book Manuscript Workshop, St. Louis, MO, September 2013

Harry Brighouse's "What Are Educational Goods and How Should They Be Distributed?"

Conference on Moral Education: Ancient and Contemporary, Evanston, IL, June 2013

Michelle Mason's "Love, Benevolence, and How to Share a Beloved's Ends"

Northwestern University Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics Conference, Evanston, IL, May 2013

John Hare's "Kant and the Notion of Conscience"

Conference on Challenges to Religious and Moral Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Indianapolis IN, September 2012.

Mary Clayton Coleman's "Yes, Virginia, There is a Genuinely Metanormative Constructivism"

American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meeting, Chicago IL, February 2012

Sharon Anderson-Gold's "The Metaphysics of Marriage: Kant on Real Personal Rights"

First Bi-Annual Meeting of the North American Kant Society, Urbana-Champaign IL, June 2011

David Sussman's "Korsgaard on the Reality of Pain"

Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston IL, May 2010

Abe Roth's "Can Shared Activity Simply Be Willed?"

Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston IL, April 2009

Edward Hinchman's "Receptivity and the Will"

Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston IL, May 2008

Helga Varden's "Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy"

American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meeting, Chicago IL, April 2008

Helga Varden's "International Political Obligation"

Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston IL, May 2007

Richard Galvin's "The Practical Contradiction Interpretation Reconsidered"

American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting, San Francisco CA, April 2007

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Northwestern University Courses Taught:

Graduate Seminars

Phil 477: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Moral Education*

Phil 402: *Proseminar: Kantian Ethics*, Fall 2013-Winter 2014

Phil 488: *Professional Skills Seminar*, Spring 2013

Phil 460: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Virtue Ethics*, Winter 2012

Phil 410: *Special Topics in Philosophy: Kant's Political Theory*, Fall 2010

Phil 477: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Moral Skepticism*, Fall 2008

Phil 410: *Special Topics in Philosophy: Responsibility*, Fall 2006

Advanced Undergraduate Classes

Phil 363: *Kant's Moral Theory*, Winter 2011; Spring 2013; Spring 2015

Phil 360: *Topics in Moral Theory: Philosophy of Education*, Fall 2013

Phil 360: *Topics in Moral Theory: Contemporary Moral Theory*, Winter 2009; Spring 2011

Phil 360: *Topics in Moral Theory: Kant's Moral Theory*, Spring 2007

Introductory Classes

Phil 273-2: *Brady Scholars Seminar: The Moral Life*, Winter 2012; Winter 2014; Winter 2015

Phil 109: *Freshman Seminar: If God is Dead, Is All Permitted?* Spring 2011

Phil 264: *Classics of Political Theory*, Spring 2009

Phil 263: *Classics of Moral Theory*, Spring 2008

Graduate Advising

I have served on the following students' dissertation committees. Doctoral defense dates and current positions are indicated in parentheses. Degrees are from NU unless noted.

Amy Flowerree (in progress)

Raffanna Donelson (chair, in progress)

Chelsea Egbert (ABD)

Carlos Pereira di Salvo (ABD)

Cristina Carrillo (ABD)

Tyler Zimmer (ABD)

Seth Mayer (ABD, Instructor at Auburn University)

Oksana Maksymchuk (2013, Assistant Professor at the University of Arkansas)

Emilie Prattico (2013, Visiting Associate at the Boston Consulting Group)

Christina Drogalis (2013, degree from Loyola University, Chicago)

Heidi Giannini (2013, degree from Baylor University, Assistant Professor at Hope College)

Max Cherem (2012, Assistant Professor at Kalamazoo College)

B. Scott Rousse (2011, Visiting Researcher at UC Berkeley)

Laura Papish (2010, Assistant Professor at George Washington University)

Kelby Harrison (2010, Chaplain Intern UCLA Santa Monica Medical Center)

Brad Cokelet (2008, Assistant Professor at the University of Miami)

Harvard University Tutorials:

I designed and independently taught these semester-long seminars for undergraduate philosophy majors.

Phil 97hf: *Applied Ethics: Commodification*, Fall 2005

Phil 98hf: *Morality and Practical Reason*, Fall 2004

Phil 98hf: *Hobbes' Leviathan*, Fall 2003

Phil 97hf: *Plato's Republic*, Fall 2001

Phil 97hf and Phil 98hf: *Theology and Moral Theory*, Spring 2000

Harvard University Teaching Fellowships:

I planned and led sections, graded papers, and held office hours for these lecture courses.

Phil 175: *Ethical Theory*, Melissa Barry, Spring 2003

Phil 102: *Aristotle*, Gisela Striker, Fall 2001

MR 66: *Moral Reasoning About Social Protest*, Susanna Siegel, Fall 2000

PROFESSIONAL AND DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE

Referee for *Philosophers' Imprint*, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, *The Journal of Ethics*, *Public Affairs Quarterly*, *Mind*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, *Ethics*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Res Philosophica*. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*.

Co-organizer of Annual Northwestern University Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (NUSTEP) Conference (2006-2015)

Reviewer for Spencer Foundation's IPEPP Small Grants Program (2014-2015)

Graduate Admissions Committee (2013-2014)

Ad Hoc Committee for Program Review (2013-2014)

Brady Program Committee (2013-2014)

Appointments Committee for Visiting Brady Scholar (2011-2012; 2012-2013)
Assessments Committee (2012-2013)
Search Committee in Moral and Political Philosophy (2011-2012)
Search Committee in 19th Century German Philosophy (2008-2009)
Speakers Committee (2008-2009, 2010-2011)
Undergraduate Studies Committee (Spring 2008)
Graduate Representative to Faculty (2000-2001)
Co-organizer of Harvard-MIT Graduate Conference (1999-2000)