

The Dialectical Context of Boghossian's Memory Argument

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Externalism¹ is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker's (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers *S* and occurrent thoughts that *p*, *S* has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that *p*. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian's 1989 'Memory Argument.'

Various authors — Ludlow 1995, Gibbons 1996, Brueckner 1997, Burge 2003 — have attempted to rebut the Memory Argument² by arguing

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- 1 Henceforth, the unqualified use of 'externalism' is meant to designate the semantic doctrine characterized below. Later on in the paper I will also speak of *epistemic* externalism; when I do so, I will always use the qualification 'epistemic externalism' (or 'externalism regarding epistemic justification') in order to avoid confusion.
 - 2 I will speak of 'the' Memory Argument; it should be noted that I have in mind the version that Boghossian formulated. This is not the only version of the argument: see Goldberg 1997. I justify my exclusive focus on Boghossian's version on two grounds. First, Boghossian's is the version that has received the most attention (for example, in the articles cited above). Second, while the argument of Goldberg 1997 is advertised as 'based on' Boghossian's Memory Argument, it is formulated without use of any considerations pertaining to memory, and so is not really a version of anything that we can call a *memory* argument at all. (This is not to denigrate the argument of Goldberg 1997; only to defend why I am not considering it here.)

against one or another of its premises regarding memory. The main burden of the present paper, by contrast, is to offer a more indirect case against Boghossian's argument. After examining the dialectic in which Boghossian's *reductio* is offered, I argue that Boghossian's case against Burge's compatibilism depends on an unacceptably strong conception of the conditions on knowledge. The result is that, faced with the choice between (i) endorsing Boghossian's memory argument and selecting a premise of Burge's compatibilist reasoning for rejection, and (ii) accepting Burge's compatibilist reasoning and selecting a premise of Boghossian's memory argument for rejection, we ought to favor (ii). Thus the present 'indirect' argument bolsters the criticisms of Ludlow 1995, Gibbons 1996, Brueckner 1997, and Burge 2003 (each of which argues against one or another premise of Boghossian's argument, and so in effect opts for [ii]). But the present 'indirect' argument differs from the previous arguments in that, whereas the previous criticisms focus on the Memory Argument's *explicit* use of a contentious thesis regarding *memory*, the present criticism focuses on the Memory Argument's *implicit* reliance on a contentious thesis regarding *knowledge*. Short of defending this knowledge thesis directly, I argue, the Memory Argument should not be regarded as successful in its attempt to rebut Burge's case for compatibilism.

I begin with the case for compatibilism in Burge 1988. Burge 1988 argued for compatibilism on the basis of the self-verifying nature of the relevant class of judgments. The relevant judgments, which I will call FP-judgments, were those first-person, present-tense judgments expressed with such sentences as 'I think (with this very thought) that writing requires concentration' and 'I judge (or doubt) that water is more common than mercury' (Burge 1988, 649). Regarding FP-judgments, Burge wrote that 'making these judgments itself makes them true' (649). We can summarize Burge's claim on this score as the claim that

(SV) FP-judgments are self-verifying.

On Burge's view, the truth of (SV) is grounded in the self-referential nature of FP-judgments. He writes, 'One is thinking that *p* in the very event of thinking knowledgeably that one is thinking it. It is thought and thought about in the same mental act' (Burge 1988, 654). Now, having established (SV), Burge goes on to draw the further conclusion that

(K) FP-judgments invariably amount to knowledge.

Burge's reasoning on this score, largely implicit in his 1988 paper, was as follows. FP-judgments are self-verifying, hence true. What is more, FP-judgments' status as self-verifying ensures that thinkers who make

such judgments are epistemically entitled to do so.³ And it is a sufficient condition for a subject *S*'s knowing that *p*, that (one) *S* has a true belief (or has formed a true judgment) that *p*, and (two) *S* is epistemically entitled to that belief (or judgment). The result is that, for any subject *S* and any FP-judgment that *p*, *S*'s FP-judgment that *p* amounts to knowledge.

Having taken himself to have presented compelling grounds for both (SV) and (K), Burge went on to draw a compatibilist conclusion. Since a thinker's 'basic self-knowledge' (the sort of knowledge manifested in FP-judgments) derives in this way from considerations pertaining to the self-referential form of the judgment involved, and since the self-referentiality of a judgment is independent of any account of the individuation of the attitudes, a thinker's 'basic self-knowledge' is not affected by the truth of any account of the individuation of the attitudes. Or, as Burge sometimes puts it: the very same considerations that serve to individuate the thought that *p*, go into individuating the judgment that I am presently thinking that *p* — since the former thought is (in Burge's own words⁴) both 'thought and thought *about*' in the latter judgment. And so we see that compatibilism regarding externalism and authoritative self-knowledge of thoughts is secure.

But Burge himself had anticipated an objection to this argument for compatibilism. Suppose *S* undergoes a series of slow switches between Earth and Twin Earth. Suppose further that *S* is informed of the switches at some *future* time, and then is asked which thought she had at that earlier time. Then it would seem that at that later time *S* is not in a position to know the thought she had earlier entertained. Burge responded to this objection from world-switching by (a) conceding that at that later time *S* 'may not know' which thought she had at the earlier time, while (b) insisting that nonetheless *S* knew the thought when she entertained it at that earlier time.

Boghossian 1989 responded to Burge's account of slow-switching by presenting the Memory Argument, which purports to bring out the absurdity of the claim that 'although *S* will not know tomorrow what he is thinking right now, he does know right now what he is thinking right now' (Boghossian 1989, 22). Boghossian reasoned as follows:

3 This latter point is the upshot of Burge 1987; but see also Burge 1998, esp. 241, for the notion of an entitlement. Below I will suggest that Burge's point on the present score can be made *without* reliance on the technical notion of an entitlement.

4 See Burge 2003, 426. This is a view that was present in his 1987.

At any given moment in the present, say t_1 , S is in a position to know what he is thinking at t_1 . By Burge's criteria, therefore, he counts as having direct and authoritative knowledge at t_1 of what he is thinking at that time. But it is quite clear that tomorrow he won't know what he thought at t_1 . No self-verifying judgment concerning his thought at t_1 will be available to him then.... But there is a mystery here. For the following would appear to be a platitude about memory and knowledge: if S knows that p at t_1 , and if (at some later time) t_2 , S remembers everything S knew at t_1 , then S knows that p at t_2 . Now, let us ask: *why* does S not know today whether yesterday's thought was a *water* thought or a *twater* thought? The platitude insists that there are only two possible explanations: either S has forgotten or he *never* knew. But surely memory failure is not to the point.... The only explanation, I venture to suggest, for why S will not know tomorrow what he is said to know today, is not that he has forgotten but that he never knew (1989, 22-3).

Such is the Memory Argument as presented by Boghossian.

I want to begin my discussion of this argument with a minor quibble; I do so to bring out the nature of the challenge the Memory Argument should be seen as presenting to Burge's case for compatibilism. The argument purports to establish that

(C) At t_1 S did not know the thought she was occurrently thinking at t_1 .

It does so on the basis of a premise asserting that

(P) At t_2 (= the time of 'recollection') S does not know the thought she was thinking at t_1 .

The minor quibble is that the very way in which Boghossian supports (P) leaves him without a reason for thinking that (C) is false. In the quote above Boghossian is explicit regarding what he takes to support (P). His claim is that

(Bog) 'No self-verifying judgment concerning [S 's] thought at t_1 will be available to [S] at t_2 .

But, as a reason in support of the contention that S fails at t_2 to know the thought she was thinking at t_1 , (Bog) does not generalize to cover the case of the (present-tense) judgment S makes at t_1 regarding her thought at t_1 . This is because at t_1 S *does* have available a self-verifying judgment regarding her thought at t_1 . What is more, *this is true for all times t* : at any time t , S has available a present-tense judgment regarding her thought at t , which judgment is self-verifying. (She need only append 'I (hereby) judge that' or 'I am presently thinking that' to the sentence that she uses to express her thought, and the result will be the self-verifying judgment in question.) It would thus appear that there is some tension between the

way in which Boghossian would have us support (P) and his conclusion (C).

I say that this is a 'minor quibble.' The quibble is minor since it does not show that Boghossian's argument fails; it only shows that, if it succeeds, it does not do so by assuming some version of (Bog) that is meant to bear on present-tense self-ascriptions. And indeed this would seem to be Boghossian's strategy: appeal to (Bog) to establish (P), and then use this result, together with a principle regarding memory, to establish (C). (For a useful formulation, see Ludlow 1995.) My point in bringing up this quibble is simply to highlight that Boghossian's argument does not *directly* confront Burge's reasoning in defense of (K). That is, rather than arguing against (K) by taking aim at Burge's reasoning from (SV) to (K), Boghossian's tries to establish $\sim(K)$ indirectly, by way of a *reductio*. I now want to argue that this is a weakness of Boghossian's argument. In particular I will be arguing that, while Boghossian (1989) is best construed as leaving (SV) in place while taking aim at (K), its case against (K) thereby depends on endorsing a contentious thesis regarding the conditions on knowledge.

Consider first my contention that Boghossian 1989 is best construed as leaving (SV) in place while taking aim at (K). It should be clear that his argument provides no reason to doubt (SV). To begin, Boghossian 1989 never *explicitly* denies anything like (SV). Rather, Boghossian thinks of the Memory Argument as a *reductio*, not of (SV), but rather of the hypothesis that 'although *S* will not know tomorrow what he is thinking right now, he does know right now what he is thinking right now' (Boghossian 1989, 22). His official attitude toward (SV) would appear to be that, whether or not (SV) is true, it cannot be used (as Burge would use it) to establish the compatibility of externalism and authoritative self-knowledge of thoughts.

What is more, it is very difficult to see how anything like the Memory Argument *could* establish the falsity of (SV). To say that a judgment is self-verifying is to say something like that it is true in virtue of being made — in Burge's language, 'making these judgments itself makes them true' (1987, 649). However we understand such locutions as 'true in virtue of' or 'made true by,' Burge himself has proposed a feature of FP-judgments that plausibly accounts for their being true in virtue of (or made true by) being made: 'One is thinking that *p* in the very event of thinking knowledgeablely that one is thinking it. It is thought and thought about in the same mental act' (Burge 1987, 654). It is hard to see how Burge could be wrong about this. For the point is simply that judgments of the relevant form are judgments in which one reports the very thought that one is thinking in the act of making the judgment in question — with the result that such judgments cannot fail to be true. If this is correct (and

again I for one don't see how it can fail to be correct), then (SV) would appear to be unassailable.⁵

The upshot of these reflections is this: if Boghossian's argument does succeed in undermining the conclusion of Burge 1988, it does not do so by undermining (SV). Consequently, since Boghossian's argument would have us conclude that there are cases in which a thinker makes a judgment of the relevant form ('I am presently thinking that *p*') yet fails to count as knowing that she is thinking that *p*, the burden of his argument appears to be that not all judgments of the relevant form count as knowledge. So understood, Boghossian's argument should be read as aiming to show, against (K), that FP-judgments (which are now conceded to be self-verifying) do not (or do not always) have the proper epistemic credentials to be knowledge.

I now want to argue that, since Boghossian's argument leaves untouched Burge's reasoning behind (SV), its case against (K) is seriously compromised. Consider the burden that Boghossian would accrue on the assumption that, having conceded the soundness of Burge's reasoning in connection with (SV), the Memory Argument nevertheless purports to undermine (K) by calling into question the epistemic credentials of FP-judgments. As noted, Burge conceives of the epistemic status of FP-judgments in terms of his notion of an 'entitlement,' defined as a positive epistemic 'status' that accrues to a judgment when the subject, insofar as her making the judgment is concerned, is 'operating in an appropriate way in accord with the norms of reason, even when these norms cannot be articulated by the individual who has that status' (Burge 1998, 241).⁶ Now since some may balk at Burge's talk of 'entitlements' and his construal of these in terms of 'operating ... in accord with the norms of reason,' we would do well to recast the epistemic status of FP-judgments in terms of other, better-understood epistemic concepts. After doing so, I will go on to argue that the Memory Argument, construed as granting Burge's case for (SV) while purporting to reduce (K) to absurdity, depends on an implausibly strong assumption regarding the epistemic status(es) appropriate to knowledge.

5 In a sense, this point should be obvious. The truth of (SV) depends on Burge's point regarding the self-referential nature of FP-judgments, that is, on the nature of *present-tense* judgments of the form 'I am presently thinking that *p*'; it is hard to see how (SV) can be called into question by anything like *memory* considerations (which involve *past-tense* judgments of the form 'I *thought* that *p*').

6 Though this characterization of an entitlement comes in a paper published nine years after the publication of Boghossian 1989, the notion of an entitlement is explicitly appealed to even in Burge 1988.

I begin with the notion of *objective (epistemic) justification*. Roughly, we can say that a belief that p enjoys objective justification just in case it is formed in such a way (through such a process) that it enjoys a high objective probability of being true. (For those who do not like talk of 'objective' probabilities, this can be replaced by talk of reliability, sensitivity, safety, or whatever one's favored analysis of the warrant or objective dimension of justification.) Then whatever one's attitude towards Burge's notion of an entitlement (and towards his claim that subjects are invariably entitled to the FP-judgments they make), there can be no doubt that FP-judgments are invariably objectively justified. In fact, the truth of (SV) entails that FP-judgments enjoy the *highest possible degree* of objective justification: given that the relevant process is one which eventuates in *self-verifying* FP-judgments, such judgments are *guaranteed* to be true whenever they are made.

Not only do FP-judgments enjoy the highest degree of objective justification, equally importantly, the fact that they do enjoy this degree of objective justification is something that can be appreciated *from the armchair*. This is very important, since it suggests that the epistemic status of FP-judgments conforms to epistemologically *internalist* demands on the introspective accessibility of justifiers.⁷ Thus, while it is true that epistemic internalists might be unimpressed by the mere fact that a class of judgments enjoys the highest degree of objective justification — they will want to know whether this fact can be appreciated by the internalist's favored epistemic method, namely, searching reflection⁸ — Burge's conclusion, that FP-judgments as a class enjoy the highest degree of objective justification, *can* be reached by reflection alone. Thus it would seem that the factors generating objective justification in the

7 Here is not the place to go into a careful formulation of epistemic internalism. For relevant attempts among internalists regarding justification, see e.g. Chisholm (1966/1989, 7); Ginet (1975, 34); Bonjour (1980, 56); and Audi (1988). (As I will note below, Audi himself is internalist regarding justification but externalist regarding knowledge; see e.g. Audi [1993, 29]). For a thorough critical discussion of the varieties of epistemically internalist positions, and for the choice-points that internalists will have to face, see Alston 1986. Finally, for other critical discussions, see Goldman (1980; 1999) and Bach (1985).

8 Admittedly, some internalists will deny that (a) objective justification plus (b) the existence of a justification available via reflection suffice to render a true belief *knowledge*. They will require, in addition, that the subject's belief be *based on* (or *grounded in*) the reflectively available justification. I will return to this suggestion below; I will argue that, though the grounding-in-a-reflective-justification requirement is arguably a plausible requirement on ascriptions of epistemic justification, it is not a plausible requirement in connection with ascriptions of *knowledge*.

case of FP-judgments are all 'available to [the subject's] direct awareness through ordinary (even if searching) reflection' (Audi 1988; as reprinted in Audi 1993, 304). Even epistemic internalists ought to be impressed.⁹

The tenor of these remarks should now be clear. We are presently pursuing the thought that Boghossian's Memory Argument means to call (K) into question while conceding Burge's case for (SV). We have just shown that, on the assumption of the soundness of Burge's case for (SV), FP-judgments (a) enjoy the highest possible degree of objective justification, and (b) are such that the fact that they do enjoy such a degree of objective justification can be known by the epistemic internalist's favored epistemic method (searching reflection).¹⁰ To simplify, let us describe any judgment of which (a) and (b) hold, *I-O justified*. The claim, in short, is that FP-judgments as a class are I-O justified. Then, on the further assumption that

(K2) I-O justified beliefs and judgments amount to knowledge,

the result would be that (K) is true. And so it would seem that those who grant Burge's case for (SV) while simultaneously seeking to deny (K) must reject (K2).

I submit that one rejects (K2) at the cost of plausibility. To see this, it is worth noting that what is at issue with respect to (K2) is independent of any thesis one might hold about the nature of epistemic justification. This is very important. Arguably, there can be cases in which a subject's belief is I-O justified yet we would not describe her as *justified* in believing as she does (as the notion of epistemic justification is ordinarily

9 Consider as well that the epistemic status of FP-judgments would also seem to conform to two other formulations of the internalist constraint on epistemic justification. On Chisholm's (1966/1989, 7) formulation, 'the concept of epistemic justification is ... internal and immediate in that one can *find out directly*, by reflection, what one is justified in believing at any time' (italics in original). On Ginet's (1975, 34) formulation, 'every one of every set of facts about *S*'s position that minimally suffices to make *S*, at a given time, justified in being confident that *p* must be *directly recognizable* to *S* at that time.' If we read 'can' in Chisholm's formulation to have the sense of 'possible in principle, possible for the rational agent,' and if we take 'recognizable' in Ginet's to have the sense of 'in principle possible to be discovered via reflection,' then both Chisholm's and Ginet's constraints are satisfied in the case of FP-judgments.

10 Again, this is not to say that any subject who makes an FP-judgment *will* know about the justification that I have said is reflectively accessible. I am only claiming that it is *available* to reflection; but this is consistent with a subject's not knowing about it. (Indeed, this is precisely the situation registered by Burge's notion of an entitlement.) I will return to this below.

conceived). Such a contention might be advanced, for example, on the basis of the claim that, if the subject herself does not *grasp* the I-O justification and base her belief on this grasped justification, then, even though her belief is I-O justified, *she* is not justified in having the belief. Let this point be granted for the sake of argument; it does not affect (K2), since (K2) is not a claim about epistemic justification at all. That is, (K2) does not say or entail that I-O justification is our ordinary notion of epistemic justification, nor does (K2) say or entail that I-O justification ought to replace our ordinary notion of epistemic justification. Rather, (K2) is a claim about *knowledge*.

For this reason, (K2) should be attractive not just to epistemic externalists (who will accept it as flowing from their externalist conception of epistemic justification) but also to most epistemic *internalists* as well. Simply put, as it is ordinarily understood, the doctrine of epistemic internalism is a thesis regarding the nature of *epistemic justification*¹¹; it is *not* (or at least not in the first instance) a thesis regarding knowledge. This is quite clear, for example, in Audi's work. Audi, who develops and defends an internalist view regarding epistemic justification,¹² writes that

... whereas justified belief is belief that is *normatively acceptable*, knowledge is belief that is *externally successful*, not just in being true but in having grounds that objectively count towards truth. (1993, 29; italics in original)

For epistemic internalists like Audi, (K2) will be unexceptional. What is more, it would seem that the prospects of *reasoning* to a repudiation of (K2), on the basis of a prior commitment to internalism regarding epistemic justification, are dim as well. Evidence for this contention is seen in the fact that many epistemic internalists explicitly dissociate the concept of epistemic justification from that of knowledge.¹³ Thus we find the arch-internalist Bonjour commenting on his general disinterest in knowledge (as opposed to justification) by writing recently that the concept of knowledge 'is best avoided as far as possible in sober episte-

11 See the references in the footnote above.

12 See Audi 1988.

13 They do so, I speculate, because they appreciate the externalist nature of the sort of epistemic support appropriate to knowledge. That is, their position (on my speculative reconstruction) is this: granted that *knowledge* presupposes belief enjoying an externalistically specified epistemic status (reliably, sensitively, or safely formed, etc.), its related cousin *justified belief* presupposes an internalist sort of epistemic support.

mological discussion,¹⁴ claiming that an approach that focuses on justification as opposed to knowledge 'is adequate ... to all of the central issues of traditional epistemology' (Bonjour 2003, 21, 23). In short, it would seem that the dialectical case for (K2) is strong *no matter* one's background ideology regarding the nature of epistemic justification. But if (K2) is true, then so too (given Burge's reflections on [SV]) is (K). I conclude that, since Boghossian's argument is most charitably interpreted as granting (SV) while taking aim at (K), its success turns on the repudiation of a claim, (K2), that enjoys broad support. We would be forgiven for expecting that the success of Boghossian's case against Burge could be established without taking on such controverted epistemological commitments.

However, it might be thought that the foregoing argument, which concluded that Boghossian's argument does not succeed in undermining either (SV) or the argument from (SV) to (K), is unfair to Boghossian. After all, in virtue of its status as a *reductio*, Boghossian's Memory Argument (if successful) would *force* one to reject (K) — with the further result that, if (SV) is true, Boghossian's Memory Argument would *force* one to reject (K2) as well. A defender of Boghossian might admit that his argument forces the rejection of (K) and (K2) without directly addressing itself either to (K2) or (more generally) to any of the reasoning behind (K). But (the defender of Boghossian might point out) in general we do not expect *reductio* argumentation to address the reasoning behind the premise(s) that are reduced to absurdity.

In reaction I want to point out the special burden on any *reductio* argument that would force us to reject the conjunction of a set of claims each of which enjoys strong independent support. Let it be granted that it is not in general incumbent on one who presents a *reductio* to select which of the premises leading to that conclusion is to be rejected. Let it

14 It is worth noting in this connection that Bonjour's reasons for 'avoiding' the concept of knowledge should not get in the way of his accepting (K2). The two main problems with the concept of knowledge, according to Bonjour, are (one) that there is no universally agreed 'adequate degree of epistemic support' presupposed by knowledge ascriptions, and (two) that 'if the levels of justification are thought of in the seemingly obvious way as something like degrees of probability in relation to the justifying premises or evidence, then the idea of a definite level of justification *short of a guarantee of truth* seems to generate a serious conflict between the ordinary use of the concept of knowledge and the demands of the probability calculus' (Bonjour 2003, 22; italics added). Presumably it will be universally agreed that if anything enjoys a level of knowledge-adequate epistemic support, FP-judgments do (given that their truth *is* guaranteed by the process through which they are made).

be granted as well that, even if the selection of the relevant premise(s) is clear to all of the parties involved, it is not in general incumbent on one who presents the *reductio* to provide an argument, independent of the *reductio* itself, against the selected premise(s). But matters are different, I submit, if the premises leading to the (would-be absurd) conclusion are, each of them, reinforced by (what at least many would regard as) *compelling independent support*. Then the very move to offer a *reductio* of the conclusion, even if it has the *prima facie* trappings of cogency, cannot ultimately convince. For in that case the would-be *reductio* would be an argument against a conclusion which itself is supported by compelling independent argumentation: a paradoxical situation, not a stable one. In this context, I submit, the proponent of a *reductio* has a greater than normal burden: identify the relevant premise(s) to be rejected, and diagnose as merely apparent the compelling independent support behind it (or them).

This is precisely the situation facing Boghossian's purported *reductio* of (K). As reconstructed here, Burge's 1988 case for (K) has three premises:

(SV) All FP-judgments are self-verifying.

(*) The self-verifying nature of FP-judgments is knowable by reflection alone.

(K2) All I-O justified beliefs (or judgments) amount to knowledge.

Burge's reasoning was this: given (SV) and (*), it follows (by the definition of 'I-O justified') that all FP-judgments are I-O justified; and so given (K2), it follows further that all FP-judgments amount to knowledge. But above I argued that it is difficult to see how either of (SV) and (*) *could* be assailed (since each is supported by primitively compelling argumentation); and I also pointed out that (K2) reflects a most plausible and widely accepted view about knowledge, which view is independent of one's background ideology regarding the nature of epistemic justification. Even granting that Boghossian's argument should be taken to be a *reductio* of the set of doctrines consisting of {(SV), (*), and (K2)}, then, this set of doctrines is such that each member is supported by strong independent considerations; and in this context the burden on a *reductio* involves identifying the relevant premise(s) to be rejected, and diagnosing as merely apparent the compelling independent support behind it (or them). Short of presenting such supplementation, the dialectical situation remains that, after taking all that Boghossian's argument has to say, there remain unrebutted (independent, compelling) arguments

on behalf of (K); and this should temper whatever enthusiasm we have for endorsing Boghossian's *reductio*.

Of course, the knife cuts both ways. Perhaps the defender of Boghossian will provide a parallel response to Burge. The idea would be that, such are the compelling reasons Boghossian has for thinking that

(C) At t_1 S does not know the thought she was thinking at t_1 ,

that Burge's argument to the contrary must be wrongheaded. Perhaps. At that point the debate becomes a question of whose side is supported by the more compelling considerations. On this score I would only point out that, since Boghossian attempts to infer a claim about a *present*-tense self-ascription from a claim about a *past*-tense self-ascription, and since such an inference would appear to depend on one or another claim regarding memory,¹⁵ it will always be open to defenders of Burge to reject the relevant claim regarding memory. Indeed, this is precisely the move that is made by the compatibilist-minded critics of Boghossian's arguments mentioned at the outset of this paper. I am not at present *endorsing* any one of these reactions; only suggesting that, given the dialectical context, such a move would appear to be entirely warranted. My claim is merely that reactions of this sort are reasonable *as long as* Boghossian does nothing that directly undermines Burge's *prima facie* compelling independent arguments for (SV) and (K). Here 'directly undermining' (SV) and/or (K) is meant to contrast with giving a *reductio*: the trouble with the *reductio* is that it yields the falsity of (SV) and/or (K) while leaving in place Burge's compelling independent argumentation on behalf of both.

In sum, my thesis concerns the dialectical situation facing anyone who wants to put a lot of stock into Boghossian's Memory Argument, as an argument that gives us a reason to reject Burge's case for compatibilism.¹⁶

15 What is more, Boghossian himself explicitly relies on a principle of memory, and so recognizes that his argument depends on one or another claim regarding memory. Consider his 'platitude about memory' (1989, 22-3).

16 To be fair to Boghossian, this may not be his aim in his (1989). He concludes that paper by writing that his aim has been to 'promote understanding, not skepticism' (1989, 23), and it is unclear whether he regards such understanding as involving an acknowledgment of the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge of thoughts. (I might add here that, given the tenor of his other work, including Boghossian 1992 and 1998, it would appear that this *is* his view. But this is a speculation.) At any rate, the crucial point at present is that, if he wants to regard his 1989 Memory Argument as offering *some* support (if only *prima facie*, and so ultimately potentially defeated support) for thinking that Burge's case for compati-

My thesis is that no such theorist can afford to rest content with Boghossian's argument as it stands. She must also address Burge's (by my lights, simple and compelling) arguments for (SV) and (K). Without directly addressing these arguments — something not yet attempted by any of the Memory Argument's defenders — the Memory Argument itself will have the appearance of calling into question something we know to be true on compelling independent grounds.¹⁷

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bilism fails — and this much he surely does want — he must address Burge's arguments for (SV) and (K).

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