Faculty

My primary interests lie in moral theory and political philosophy. I research contemporary questions, while bringing the history of these fields to bear on current debates. I have studied Kant and the contemporary Kantian tradition in the most depth, but I am also interested in ancient ethics, the early modern period leading up to Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, among others. Much of my work centers on the nature, authority, and appropriate limits of personal autonomy. I ask how it is possible and when it is appropriate to influence others' views about the reasons that they have, and when respect requires us to defer to their current views about this. In past work I have addressed these questions as they arise in political contexts and in interpersonal relationships of love. I have also written on the implications of parents' interests in shaping their children's views about value for custody suits following divorce. I am currently working on two projects. One seeks to understand the possibility and permissibility of moral education, given that this seems to involve having a causal influence on another person's will. This project also involves consideration of the place for and limits of individual responsibility. My other project is an evaluation of moral skepticism, asking which skeptical challenges, if any, moral theorists should address.


Writings and Recently Taught Courses

Publications

• "Moral Community: Escaping the Ethical State of Nature", in Philosophers' Imprint (forthcoming)
  I explain how one person can have the authority to make choices that create reasons for another by developing Kant's argument, found in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, that we have an obligation to leave what he calls the Ethical State of Nature and join together in the Moral Community. This argument parallels the political argument of the Doctrine of Right.
• "The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement", in The Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming).
  I argue that we have strong reasons to conduct our political inquiry within the guidelines of Rawls' political liberalism, but deny that we have an obligation always to do so.
• "Against Beneficence: A Normative Account of Love", Ethics vol 119:1, October 2008
  I argue that rather than aiming at the well-being of those whom we love, we should aim to share in their ends, and defend an interpretation of the latter requirement.

Works in Progress

• Kant on Freedom and Moral Education
  I consider two problems apparent for moral education, one that makes it look impossible, and one that makes it look impermissible . I argue that we can simultaneously resolve both by understanding the influence of moral education as rational rather than causal.
• Taking Responsibility
  I argue that a person's history might affect her deliberations by making some incentives more salient or some considerations that aren't reasons appear to be so. Understanding this can lead us to revise our interpretation of the attitude behind her actions and this may alter their moral significance without eliminating it.
• Anselmian Moral Skepticism
  Many contemporary moral philosophers think that it is a mistake to take moral skepticism seriously. I argue that there are many different skeptical challenges to morality that an acknowledged inability to answer a particular one is a serious problem for moral theory.
• Children's Interests and the Fathers' Rights Movement
  I argue that fundamental commitments of political liberalism demand that we take parental rights rather than children's interests to provide standards for settling custody cases. But I reject the claim that this should lead us to embrace a 50/50 split as our default custody arrangement.

• Inner Freedom and Required Ends
  I argue for a more robust role for required positive ends within a Kantian moral theory than others have acknowledged. Reason must give us a task to work towards, not merely limit our actions, if we are to be free in Kant's own sense.
• The Hobbesian Agent and the Bondage of Self-Interest
  I claim that a Hobbesian view of reasons puts us in manipulative relationships not just towards others, but also towards ourselves. I then argue that a similar problem arises for David Gauthier's contemporary rehabilitation of a Hobbesian view.

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Current CV

• CURRENT CV

Recently Taught Courses

• PHIL 360 Topics in Moral Theory: Kant's Moral Theory
• PHIL 410 Special Topics in Philosophy: Responsibility
• PHIL 264 Classics of Political Theory
• PHIL 360 Topics in Moral Theory: Contemporary Moral Theory
• PHIL 477 Seminar in Ethical Theory: Moral Skepticism
• PHIL 263 Classics of Ethical Theory

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