People

Sanford Goldberg

Professor
Office: Crowe 3-179

E-mail: s-goldberg@northwestern.edu
Phone: 847-491-8524

Sandy Goldberg (PhD Columbia University, 1995) works in the areas of Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind and Language. Goldberg’s interests in Epistemology include such topics as reliabilism, the epistemology of testimony, the internalism/externalism dispute, self-knowledge, and skepticism. In the Philosophy of Mind and Language, his interests center on the individuation of the propositional attitudes, externalist theories of mental content and linguistic meaning, and the semantics of speech and attitude reports. A good sample of his work can be found in his two recent books, Anti-Individualism (Cambridge University Press, 2007) and Relying on Others (Oxford University Press, 2010).

CURRENT CV

Work

Books

Relying on Others. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 2010.
Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification.
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy), 2007.
Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford
University Press, 2007. Editor.
Gray Matters: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (New York: M.E.
Sharpe, 1997). Co-authored with Andrew Pessin.
The Twin Earth Chronicles (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996). Co-edited with
Andrew Pessin, with an introduction by Hilary Putnam.

Selection of Recent Articles

"A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coheretism." Erkenntnis (forthcoming).
“The (Not-so-) Evil Demon case against Justification Internalism.” Analysis (forthcoming).
“What is the subject-matter of the theory of epistemic justification?” In D. Henderson and J. Greco, eds., The Point and Purpose of Epistemic Evaluation. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.) (forthcoming)
“Sensitivity from Others.” In K. Becker and T. Black, eds., The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (Forthcoming.)
“Disagreement, Defeaters, and Assertion.” In D. Christiansen and J. Lackey, eds. Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press.) (Forthcoming).
"The Epistemic Utility of What is Said." In Compositionality, Context, and
Semantic Values: Essays in Honor of Ernie Lepore, eds. R. Stainton and C.
Viger. Springer Verlag (forthcoming).
"How lucky can you get?" special Synthese edition on Epistemic Luck
(forthcoming).
"The Division of Epistemic Labour." Episteme 8:1, 112-25 (February 2011)
“The metasemantics of memory.” Philosophical Studies 153: 95-107 (January 2011).
“Putting the norm of assertion to work: the case of testimony.” In J. Brown and J. Cappelen, eds., Assertion (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 175-95.
"If that were true I would have heard about it by now." In Goldman and Whitcomb, eds. Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 92-108. [invited]
"The knowledge account of assertion and the conditions on testimonial
knowledge." Contribution to Williamson on Knowledge, eds. D. Pritchard and
P. Greenough. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 60-72.
“Reliabilism in Philosophy.” Philosophical Studies 124: 1, 105-17 (January 2009).
"Experts, Semantic and Epistemic", Noûs 43:4, 581-98 (December 2009).
"Metaphysical Realism and Thought", American Philosophical Quarterly 45:2, 149-64 (April 2008).
"Must Differences in Cognitive Value be Transparent?", Erkenntnis 69:2, 165-87 (2008).
"Internalism, Externalism, and the Epistemology of Linguistic Understanding", Communication and Cognition 41:3, 191-216 (2008).
"Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited." Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 76:1, 1-36 (January 2008).
"Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification."
Noûs 41:2, 178-203 (March 2007).
"Semantic Externalism and Epistemic Illusions," in S. Goldberg, ed.
Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 235-52.
"The Problem of the Many Minds." Minds and Machines 16: 463-70 (2006).
With Brad Monton.
"Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discrimination." Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 87:3, 301-14 (2006).
"An Anti-Individualistic Semantics for 'Empty' Natural Kind Terms." Grazer
Philosophische Studien 70: 55-76 (January 2006).
"Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony."
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72: 3, 576-93 (May 2006). With
David Henderson.
"Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge," in Lackey,
J. and Sosa, E., eds. The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 127-44 (2006).
"The Dialectical Context of Boghossian's Memory Argument." Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 35:1, 135-48 (March 2005).
"Testimonial knowledge from unsafe testimony." Analysis 65:4, 302-11
(October 2005).
"Radical Interpretation, Understanding, and Testimonial Transmission."
Synthese 138:3, 387-416 (March 2004).
"Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism." Philosophical
Studies 116:1, 53-78 (October 2003).
"What do you know when you know your own thoughts?" in Nuccetelli, S. ed.,
New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2003), pp. 241-56.
"On our alleged a priori knowledge that water exists." Analysis 63:1, pp.
38-41 (January 2003).
"Do anti-individualistic construals of the attitudes capture the agent's
conceptions?" Noûs 36:4, pp. 597-621 (December 2002).
"Belief and its linguistic expression: Towards a belief-box account of
first-person authority." Philosophical Psychology 15:1, 65-76 (2002).
"Testimonially Based Knowledge from False Testimony", Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).
"Externalism and Self-Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy", Philosophical Studies, 100:1, 51-78 (July 2000).
"The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge", Synthese, 118:2, 165-99 (1999).
"The Relevance of Discriminatory Knowledge of Content", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999).
"Self-Knowledge, Self-Ascription, and the Memory Argument", Analysis, 57:3, 211-219 (July 1997).