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Sanford Goldberg

Professor
E-mail: s-goldberg@northwestern.edu

Sandy Goldberg (PhD Columbia University, 1995) works in the areas of Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind and Language. Goldberg’s interests in Epistemology include such topics as reliabilism, the epistemology of testimony, the internalism/externalism dispute, self-knowledge, and skepticism. In the Philosophy of Mind and Language, his interests center on the individuation of the propositional attitudes, externalist theories of mental content and linguistic meaning, and the semantics of speech and attitude reports. A good sample of his work can be found in his two recent books, Anti-Individualism (Cambridge University Press, 2007) and Our Epistemic Reliance on Others (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

 

CURRENT CV

 

Work

Books

• Our Epistemic Reliance on Others. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Forthcoming.
• Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification.
  Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy), 2007.
• Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology.  Oxford
  University Press, 2007.  Editor.
• Gray Matters: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (New York: M.E.
  Sharpe, 1997). Co-authored with Andrew Pessin.
• The Twin Earth Chronicles (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).  Co-edited with
  Andrew Pessin, with an introduction by Hilary Putnam.

Selection of Recent Articles

• "Metaphysical Realism and Thought", American Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming.
• "Must Differences in Cognitive Value be Transparent?", Erkenntnis, (forthcoming).
• "Internalism, Externalism, and the Epistemology of Linguistic Understanding", Communication and Cognition, (forthcoming).
• "Experts, Semantic and Epistemic", forthcoming in Noûs.
• "If that were true I would have heard about it by now" (forthcoming).  To
  appear in Goldman and Whitcomb, eds.  The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

• "The Problem of the Many Minds."  Minds and Machines 16: 463-70 (2006).
  With Brad Monton.
• "The knowledge account of assertion and the conditions on testimonial
  knowledge."  Contribution to Williamson on Knowledge, eds. D. Pritchard and
  P. Greenough.  Oxford: Oxford University Press (in preparation).
• "Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discrimination."  Pacific Philosophical
  Quarterly 87:3, 301-14 (2006).
• "Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited."  Philosophy and
  Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
• "An Anti-Individualistic Semantics for 'Empty' Natural Kind Terms."  Grazer
  Philosophische Studien 70: 55-76 (January 2006).
• "The Epistemic Utility of What is Said."  In Compositionality, Context, and
  Semantic Values: Essays in Honor of Ernie Lepore, eds. R. Stainton and C.
  Viger.  Springer Verlag (forthcoming).
• "Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification."
  Noûs 41:2, 178-203 (March 2007).
• "Testimonial knowledge from unsafe testimony."  Analysis 65:4, 302-11
  (October 2005).
• "How lucky can you get?"  special Synthese edition on Epistemic Luck
  (forthcoming).
• "Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony."
  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72: 3, 576-93 (May 2006).  With
  David Henderson.
• "Semantic Externalism and Epistemic Illusions," in S. Goldberg, ed.
  Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford
  University Press, 2007), 235-52.
• "The Dialectical Context of Boghossian's Memory Argument."  Canadian Journal
  of Philosophy 35:1, 135-48 (March 2005).
• "Radical Interpretation, Understanding, and Testimonial Transmission."
  Synthese 138:3, 387-416 (March 2004).
• "Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge," in Lackey,
  J. and Sosa, E., eds. The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: Oxford
  University Press), 127-44 (2006).
• "Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism."  Philosophical
  Studies 116:1, 53-78 (October 2003).
• "What do you know when you know your own thoughts?" in Nuccetelli, S. ed.,
  New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: MIT
  Press, 2003), pp. 241-56.
• "On our alleged a priori knowledge that water exists."  Analysis 63:1, pp.
  38-41 (January 2003).
• "Do anti-individualistic construals of the attitudes capture the agent's
  conceptions?" Noûs 36:4, pp. 597-621 (December 2002).
• "Belief and its linguistic expression: Towards a belief-box account of
  first-person authority."  Philosophical Psychology 15:1, 65-76 (2002).
• "Testimonially Based Knowledge from False Testimony", Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).
• "Externalism and Self-Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy", Philosophical Studies, 100:1, 51-78 (July 2000).
• "The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge", Synthese, 118:2, 165-99 (1999).
• "The Relevance of Discriminatory Knowledge of Content", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999).
• "Self-Knowledge, Self-Ascription, and the Memory Argument", Analysis, 57:3, 211-219 (July 1997).

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