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Sean Ebels-Duggan


UC Irvine, 2007
Curriculum Vitae

I am interested primarily in the philosophy of logic and mathematics, with associated interests in early analytic philosophy and Kant.  Ages ago, I worked on a dissertation on the normativity of logic.  My published work has been on the logic of neo-Fregean abstraction.  But my interests in logic are not limited to that, and my interests in general are not limited to logic. 


  • "Deductive Cardinality Results and Nuisance-like Principles".  Forthcoming in The Review of Symbolic Logic.

    Abstract. The injective version of Cantor’s theorem appears in full second-order logic as the inconsistency of the abstraction principle, Frege’s Basic Law V (BLV), an inconsistency easily shown using Russell’s paradox. This incompatibility is akin to others—most notably that of a (Dedekind) infinite universe with the Nuisance Principle (NP) discussed by neo-Fregean philosophers of mathematics. This paper uses the Burali-Forti paradox to demonstrate this incompatibility, and another closely related, without appeal to principles related to the axiom of choice—a result hitherto unestablished. It discusses both the general interest of this result, its interest to neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics, and the potential significance of the Burali-Fortian method of proof.

  • "Abstraction Principles and the Classification of Second-Order Equivalence Relations", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 60:1, 2019.

    This paper improves two existing theorems of interest to neo-logicist philosophers of mathematics. The first is a classification theorem due to Fine for equivalence relations between concepts definable in a well-behaved second-order logic. The improved theorem states that if an equivalence relation is defined without non-logical vocabulary, then the bicardinal slice of any equivalence class—those equinumerous elements of the equivalence class with equinumerous complements—can have one of only three profiles. The improvements to Fine's theorem allow for an analysis of the well-behaved models had by an abstraction principle, and this in turn leads to an improvement of Walsh and Ebels-Duggan's relative categoricity theorem.
  • "Relative Categoricity and Abstraction Principles” (joint work with Sean Walsh, UC Irvine).  The Review of Symbolic Logic, 8:3 (572–606), 2015.

    Many recent writers in the philosophy of mathematics have put great weight on the relative categoricity of the traditional axiomatizations of our foundational theories of arithmetic and set theory (Parsons, 1990; Parsons, 2008, sec. 49; McGee, 1997; Lavine, 1999; Väänänen & Wang, 2014). Another great enterprise in contemporary philosophy of mathematics has been Wright’s and Hale’s project of founding mathematics on abstraction principles (Hale & Wright, 2001; Cook, 2007). In Walsh (2012), it was noted that one traditional abstraction principle, namely Hume’s Principle, had a certain relative categoricity property, which here we term natural relative categoricity. In this paper, we show that most other abstraction principles are not naturally relatively categorical, so that there is in fact a large amount of incompatibility between these two recent trends in contemporary philosophy of mathematics. To better understand the precise demands of relative categoricity in the context of abstraction principles, we compare and contrast these constraints to (i) stability-like acceptability criteria on abstraction principles (cf. Cook, 2012), (ii) the Tarski-Sher logicality requirements on abstraction principles studied by Antonelli (2010b) and Fine (2002), and (iii) supervaluational ideas coming out of the work of Hodes (198419901991).
  • “The Nuisance Principle in Infinite Settings”.  Thought:  A Journal of Philosophy, 4:4 (263–268), December 2015.

    Neo-Fregeans have been troubled by the Nuisance Principle (NP), an abstraction principle that is consistent but not jointly (second-order) satisfiable with the favored abstraction principle HP. We show that logically this situation persists if one looks at joint (second-order) consistency rather than satisfiability: under a modest assumption about infinite concepts, NP is also inconsistent with HP.
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